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No act of Congress can authorize or make a law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... Would it be appropriate
legislation to enforce [the Fourteenth Amendment] that Congress should pass
an act prohibiting a State from doing so or directing it to do so? Congress is
simply restrained from doing this itself.
[A]n attempt on the part of Congress to exercise powers not granted, and much
more, powers prohibited, is a usurpation that cannot be justified by any
legislation under the fourteenth amendment .... I
[The States] shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion .... 2
1. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 572 (1871) (statement of Sen. Stockton).
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(a), 107 Stat. 1488
(1993), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 1788 the North Carolina legislature was considering
ratification of the Constitution, a constitution that did not contain a
Bill of Rights. As the delegates reached the Religious Test Clause,3
Henry Abbot remarked:
Some are afraid... that, should the Constitution be received, they would be
deprived of the privilege of worshiping God according to their consciences,
which would be taking from them a benefit they enjoy under the present con-
stitution. They wish to know if their religious and civil liberties be secured
under this system, or whether the general government may not make laws in-
fringing their religious liberties.... Many wish to know what religion shall be
established. 4
James Iredell, Federalist, former North Carolina Attorney General,
and future Supreme Court justice, responded that he was
"astonished" that anyone should conceive that Congress had
"authority to interfere in the establishment of any religion whatso-
ever."' He went on, "If any future Congress should pass an act con-
cerning the religion of the country, it would be an act which they are
not authorized to pass .... Every one would ask, 'Who authorized the
government to pass such an act?' It is not warranted by the
Constitution, and is barefaced usurpation."6 Iredell then referred to
the Guaranty Clause7 and asked, rhetorically, "why a guaranty of
religious freedom was not included." Iredell answered his own ques-
tion: "Had Congress undertaken to guaranty religious freedom, or
any particular species of it, they would then have had a pretence to
interfere in a subject they have nothing to do with. Each state, so far
as the [Guaranty Clause] does not interfere, must be left to the opera-
tion of its own principles."8
In 1993 Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ('RFRA") 9 which provided that government, including the United
States and the states, "shall not substantially burden a person's exer-
3. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3 ("N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public Trust under the United States").
4. Jonathan Elliot, ed., 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 191-92 (Burt Franklin, 2d ed. 1888) ("Elliot's Debates").
5. Id. at 194.
6. Id.
7. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government").
8. 4 Elliot's Debates at 195 (cited in note 4).
9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1448 (1993),
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
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cise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general appli-
cability" except where the government can demonstrate that the
burden furthers "a compelling governmental interest" and is "the
least restrictive means of furthering that... interest."1
In his Rose Garden ceremony upon the signing of RFRA,
President Bill Clinton hailed the Act as "affilrm[ing] the historic role
that people of faith have played in the history of this country and the
constitutional protections that those who profess and express their
faith have always demanded and cherished."", The President declared
that RFRA "reverse[d]" the Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith 2 and established a standard that he was "convinced
[was] far more consistent with the intent of the Founders of this
Nation than the Supreme Court decision."' 3
Like the President, we should celebrate the role of people of
faith, and we should certainly welcome any light that can be shed
upon the cathedral of church-state relations, an arena that has tradi-
tionally "generate[d] [more] heat.., than light.' 4 The Court's cases
are a muddle of conflicting doctrines, principles, and rules that guar-
antee only that any church-state dispute will eventually find its way
into the courts for, what appears to many as, arbitrary resolution.
More and more it appears that the key to understanding the Court's
ever changing views is the "Rule of Five."
Unfortunately, whatever consistency RFRA might bring to the
substance of church-state relations comes at the expense of clarity in
federal-state relations. This is unfortunate because the First
Amendment does not address church-state relations; it concerns
church-federal relations. Whatever else RFRA is, it is not "consistent
with the intent of the Founders," at least with respect to Congress's
power over religious freedom in the states. Congress enacted RFRA
10. Id. §§ 2000bb-l(a), (b); 2000bb-2(1).
11. Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 29 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 2377 (Nov. 16, 1993). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
12. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Court, without expressly overruling any of its prior
precedents, held that the Free Exercise Clause was not offended by the "incidental effect[s]" of
"generally applicable and otherwise valid" laws. Id. at 878. Smith has been soundly criticized.
See, for example, James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 91
(1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1109 (1990). Even defenders of Smith's result do not defend the opinion. See, for example,
William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308
(1991).
13. 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 2377 (cited in note 11).
14. Philip B. Kurland, Religion and the Law 15 (Aldine, 1962).
19951 1543
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
in the teeth of the First Amendment, which begins "Congress shall
make no law...."15
I demonstrate in Part II that the Constitution expresses rela-
tionships between the national government and the people, the na-
tional government and the states, the states and the people, and
among the three great departments of the national government as a
series of forms: powers, immunities, privileges, and disabilities. The
Founders '16 choice of form has consequences and reflects deliberate
decisions. The consequences of these choices of form are readily ap-
parent in the Bill of Rights. Seven of the first eight amendments
consist of privileges and immunities, which are personal rights that
inure to people, persons, owners, and the accused. Only one of the
first eight amendments-the First Amendment-is a governmental
disability. The First Amendment's disability reflects two distinct con-
cepts: (1) the disability applies to the national government and not
the states, and (2) the disability applies to Congress and not the fed-
eral judiciary. The former is a familiar principle of federalism; the
second, an all but overlooked principle of separation of powers.
Although both of these concepts survived early tests of the First
Amendment, much of the debate since the founding has been over
whether the First Amendment is a disability (or, to use Professor
Smith's term, 'jurisdictional ' '17) or whether it states purely personal
rights. As modern Americans, we recognize immediately that we
regard First Amendment rights as personal, but this was not true in
the first century of the First Amendment, including the period sur-
rounding the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While the Founders insisted that Congress had no power over
religion, speech, or press, and that the First Amendment assigned
responsibilities for church-state matters to the states, 18 the
Federalists conveniently abandoned these views in 1798 in order to
15. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
Const., Amend. I.
16. For convenience I intend to refer to those who drafted the Constitution of 1787 and its
first ten amendments as the "Founders" and to those who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment
as the "Framers."
17. Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of
Religious Freedom 26 (Oxford U., 1995) ('rhe question is not whether the [religion] clauses
imposed substantive restrictions on the national government ... but instead whether the
restrictions were adopted to effect a positive national policy on the subject of religious freedom
or, more modestly, were calculated merely to assign jurisdiction over matters of religion to the
states").
18. See notes 77-99 and accompanying text.
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rationalize the Sedition Act of 1798.19 Instead of seeing the First
Amendment as jurisdictional, the Federalists claimed that Congress
had power to regulate speech and press, so long as it did not abridge
those rights. Republican opponents of the Sedition Act, led by
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, consistently argued that the
First Amendment was, pure and simple, confirmation that Congress
possessed no power in this area, and that the substantive content of
religious liberty and free expression was defined exclusively by the
states.20 Although the First Amendment figured in very few cases
prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the cases
reflect the understanding of Jefferson and Madison.
In Part III I discuss the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment
on the First Amendment. The debate begun during the Sedition Act
was renewed in 1866 during the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment and arose again in the civil rights enforcement debates of
1871-72, as Radical Republicans, holding idiosyncratic views of the
Constitution, argued that the First Amendment was a personal
privilege of the same genre as the Fourth or Fifth Amendments.21
Democrats and more moderate Republicans maintained, as had the
Republicans of the earlier generation, that the First Amendment was
unique among the Bill of Rights and described the relationship
between Congress and the states over the subjects of religious
freedom and freedom of speech and press.22 The Supreme Court
straddled these arguments. . For a time after ratification the Court
continued to maintain that the First Amendment did not apply to the
states, but the Court made a series of missteps which ensured that, in
the Court's rush to absorb or incorporate the personal guarantees of
the Bill of Rights against the states, the First Amendment would
follow.
In Part IV I discuss the textual basis for incorporation of the
First Amendment and Congress's power to enforce the First
Amendment through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.23
Modem theories of incorporation fail to account for the difference
between the disability in the First Amendment and the remaining
privileges and immunities in the Bill of Rights. These theories
19. See notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
20. See notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
21. See notes 244-57 and accompanying text.
22. See notes 258-71 and accompanying text.
23. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article").
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assume uncritically that the First Amendment states personal rights
only and is, therefore, consistent with Congress's powers to enforce
the provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. I conclude
that, whatever the merits of incorporation of Amendments Two
through Eight, neither the Privileges or Immunities Clause nor the
Due Process Clause is a proper vehicle for incorporating the First
Amendment. Congress's section 5 power, the so-called Morgan
power,24 does not correct this defect.
In Part V I conclude that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act is unconstitutional, violating the very provision it purports to
enforce. I propose a limited corrective, a modest change in course, for
the distance Congress and the Court have traveled from the First
Amendment, and I suggest how the Court might rectify its section 5
views without entirely reversing its questionable tack on incorpora-
tion of the First Amendment.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: TEXT AND THE
FOUNDING
A. The Structure of Constitutional Powers: Of Powers, Immunities,
and Disabilities
The Constitution is about power. It consists of a series of pow-
ers granted, reserved, or assigned. In its modern conception, a
constitution should serve as a structure for protecting individuals
from the coercive authority of the government. The Founders, how-
ever, did not regard the United States Constitution as the ultimate
means of guaranteeing the political and personal autonomy of indi-
viduals. Rather, it sought to allocate power between the federal gov-
ernment and the states, assigning to the federal government those
matters essential for resolution by a national authority, and reserving
to the states those matters which were more appropriately handled by
local authorities. Having decided that the national government could
more appropriately resolve some matters, the Founders diffused the
powers they granted to the federal government, lest any department
24. The name derives from Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), where the Court
held that Congress could "prohibit the enforcement of state law by legislating under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment" even if the judiciary would have concluded that the state did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 649.
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abuse the powers vested in a single coercive body.25 They also de-
clared certain matters simply beyond the ken of any governmental
action, state or federal.
The mechanism for accomplishing the allocation and reserva-
tion of power was the Founders' ability to describe legal relationships
between the federal government and the people, between the federal
government and state governments, and between different depart-
ments of the federal government. The Constitution is an intricately
woven document of genius and compromise, of carefully laid lines of
authority, and of disparate rights cobbled together.
Helpful to understanding the legal relationships set forth in
the Constitution is the important insight of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld
that all legal relationships are binary. According to Hohfeld, every
legal relationship must involve at least two parties,26 and their
relationship can be described in terms of one of four pairs of correla-
tive terms: right and duty, privilege and no right, power and liability,
and immunity and disability.27 The existence of a right in X necessar-
ily implies that there exists some Y who has a duty to X; conversely,
to state that Y has a duty suggests that there exists some X who can
enforce Y's performance. Right and duty are correlative and must be
found together.28 Similarly, immunity and disability are correlative.
If X has an immunity, there exists some Y who is legally disabled. It
makes no sense to speak of X's immunity without knowing who is
thereby disabled; conversely, if we know that Y is legally disabled, we
know that an immunity has been created in some X.29
The Constitution, written by a generation schooled in the
terms of the common law, expresses relationships that fit well within
25. Federalist 47 (Madison), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers 323, 326
(Wesleyan U., 1961).
26. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L. J. 16, 28 (1913); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L. J. 710, 712 (1917). For an insightful
discussion of Hohfeld, see James E. Herget, American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970: A History 101-
16 (Rice U., 1990).
27. Hohfeld, 23 Yale L. J. at 30 (cited in note 26); Hohfeld, 26 Yale L. J. at 710 (cited in
note 26).
28. Hohfeld, 23 Yale L. J. at 30-32 (cited in note 26).
29. Id. at 55. Additionally, Hohfeld draws a useful distinction between what he calls
"multital" and "paucital" rights. Hohfeld, 26 Yale L. J. at 718-20 (cited in note 26). Multital
rights (for example, rights in rem) are those held by the population at large; paucital rights (or
rights in personam) are those held by a discrete group or an individual. See Tyler v. Judges of
the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (1900) ("All proceedings, like all rights,
are really against persons. Whether they are proceedings or rights in rem depends on the
number of persons affected").
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Hohfeld's scheme, although not always in precisely these same
terms. 0 For example, the Constitution confers or denies powers to
federal or state governments in different ways. The Founders'
Constitution, following the Articles of Confederation, conferred
greater powers on a national government, but it did not confer all the
powers inherent in sovereignty. Article I vests Congress only with
such 'Towers herein granted,"31 and Congress must affirmatively
assert the source of its power. The need to assert a source of power is
not a burden the states must bear. Assuming that the states have not
acted contrary to any provisions of their own constitutions, they need
only demonstrate that they are not disabled, expressly or implicitly,
by the United States Constitution.32 The Constitution is, by and
large, not a document about restraining the states in order to ensure
the political or personal autonomy of individuals; state restraints are
more often a means of ensuring exclusive power to the federal
government.
The critical sections for defining Congress's powers are
Sections 8, 9, and 10 in Article I. Section 8, of course, contains the
affirmative grants of power to Congress. s3 Following Hohfeld, a grant
of power to Congress necessarily implies that some person or group of
persons is subject to a liability; there must exist someone who is
subject to the powers of Congress defined in Section 8. Three possible
groups suggest themselves: people, and here we mean individuals,
families, business associations, and so on; other levels of government,
namely, the states; and other departments of the national
30. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness 17 (U. Chicago, 1965)
("[T]he framers set forth what most accurately might be described as either a schedule of
immunities or a body of liberties-to borrow the phrase used in seventeenth-century
Massachusetts to describe equivalent constitutional prohibitions).
One of the reasons Hohfeld set forth his scheme, acknowledging that lawyers and jurists did
not use terms consistently, was to impose some discipline on the "ambiguity and looseness of
our legal terminology." Hohfeld, 23 Yale L. J. at 21 (cited in note 26). The Attorney General, in
an important Civil War-era opinion on United States citizenship, expressed a similar thought:
"the words rights, privileges, immunities are abusively used, as if they were synonymous. The
word right is generic, common, embracing whatever may be lawfully claimed. Privileges are
specialty rights belonging to the individual or class, and not to the mass. Immunities are rights
of exemption only, freedom from what otherwise would be a duty, obligation, or burden." 10 Op.
Atty. Gen. 382, 407 (1862). See also Cong. Globe at app.47 (cited in note 1) (statement of Rep.
Kerr) ("It is most erroneous to suppose that the words 'rights,' 'privileges,' and 'immunities' are
synonymous.... The word 'rights' is generic, embracing all that may be lawfully claimed, and it
is affirmative; but the others are, in the most exact and legal definition, both restrictive and
negative'1.
31. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1.
32. See, for example, Federalist 32 (Hamilton), in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 200
(cited in note 25).
33. I recognize that § 8 is not the sum total of Congress's powers, and that other powers of
the federal government are found in other articles of the Constitution.
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government, obviously, the executive and judiciary. Take the
Commerce Clause as an example. The fact that the Constitution
grants Congress power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
sovereign Indian tribes, and among the states" implies a liability both
in those people whom such congressional regulation might affect and
in the states that have ceded a portion of their sovereignty to
Congress.35 The affirmative grant to Congress also suggests that the
principal regulator of interstate commerce is Congress, and not the
President or the federal judiciary.36 The Founders might have
accomplished the same purpose by expressing the relationship
between Congress and individuals or Congress and states as a
liability. For example, the Founders might have provided that "states
and persons shall be subject to regulation respecting commerce with
foreign nations, with sovereign Indian tribes, and among the states."
Though these are equivalent statements of the relationship between
the federal government and persons and states, the latter does not
effectively allocate power between Congress, the President, and the
judiciary. It was more efficient for the Founders to express the
relationship as a power rather than as a liability.
Article I, Section 9 contains disabilities, things that the federal
government cannot do, and implies that corresponding immunities
have been created. But as with Section 8 powers, identifying the
parties possessing the immunities is not always as easy as it seems.
We would naturally characterize the Habeas Corpus Clause,37 for
example, as creating an immunity in people, whose right to the great
writ may not be suspended except when public safety demands it in
cases of rebellion or invasion. But the Habeas Clause has a federal-
ism component. The states are also beneficiaries of Congress's
disability because Congress may not suspend the states' privilege of
granting or denying habeas. 38 The Habeas Clause is a guarantee to
federal prisoners and a promise of non-interference to the states; both
34. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
35. "The powers of the Union, on the great subjects of war, peace, and commerce, and on
many others, are in themselves limitations of the sovereignty of the states." Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheaton) 264, 382 (1821).
36. See Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning the Court's role
in enforcing the Dormant Commerce Clause).
37. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
38. Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right
to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 862, 865, 871-72 & n.42 (1994).
See also William Rawle, A View of the Constitution 113-14 (D.H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829).
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can lay legitimate claim to the immunity created through the
disability in Section 9. Yet the Founders were not so didactic as to
spell out all of these relationships; in creating a national government
of limited powers, it was sufficient to describe what Congress could
and could not do. Similarly, the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto
Clauses3 9 benefit individuals, but they bear a strong separation of
powers component; the clauses serve as a guarantee to the federal
judiciary of congressional non-interference with judicial review, which
is necessarily retrospective.4 It is easy to identify individuals as the
beneficiaries of these congressional disabilities, but it would be a
mistake to identify only individuals without considering-in a scheme
where separation of powers and federalism matter-who else may lay
claim to the immunity.
Section 10 contains disabilities on the states. As with the con-
gressional disabilities in Section 9, Section 10's Ex Post Facto, Bill of
Attainder, and Contracts Clauses4' may be described as a "shield [for
the people of the United States] and their property" and thus a "bill of
rights for the people of each state.' '42 Yet it would be an oversimplifi-
cation to see Section 10 as granting immunities only to people. The
clause disabling the states from entering into treaties, granting let-
ters of marque and reprisal, and coining money43 guarantee to
Congress or the President that their respective powers over treaties,4"
letters of marque and reprisal,45 and coining money 46 are exclusive.
Even the Contracts Clause, which disables the states alone, suggests
that the Founders intended to protect people from state power to
impair the obligation of contracts, while permitting the federal gov-
ernment to impair contracts when necessity required.47
39. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
40. Thus, the Bill of Attainder Clause provides that no such "Law shall be passed." Id.
Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L. J. 1131,
1205 n.330 (1991) (citing John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 90 (Harvard U., 1980)). See
also Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) 333, 388 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting).
41. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
42. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
43. U.S. Coast., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
44. Id. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
45. Id. Art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
46. Id. Art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
47. See Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the
Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 267,
286, 289, 294 (1988). Professor McConnell also suggests that the reason the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment originally applied only to the federal government was that the Founders
feared that the remoteness of the federal government would make it less sensitive to the rights
of property owners. Id. at 286-87, 292.
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The Founders drafted Sections 9 and 10 differently, and the
difference is significant. Section 9 is written in passive form: 'The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended"; "No
Tax or Duty shall be laid.. ."; "No Preference shall be given .... ." By
contrast, the three clauses in section 10 are written in active voice;
each begins, "No State shall ... ." Certainly Section 9 could have
been written in active voice to parallel Section 10: "Congress shall
pass no Bill of Attainder or Ex Post Facto Law." The Founders'
stylistic choices, while perhaps dismissible as "elegant variation, 48
more likely have meaning. They drafted Section 9 as they did because
Congress is not the only federal department disabled by Section 9.
The disabilities in Section 9, except where the Constitution provides
otherwise, apply to all of the departments of the United States, not
just to Congress. 49 As Chief Justice John Marshall pointed out,
"[S]ome of [Section 9's disabilities] use language applicable only to
Congress: others are expressed in general terms."5o For example,
Congress, the executive, and the judiciary shall not suspend the writ
of Habeas Corpus, except in defined "Cases."'51 Although there is
probably little danger that the judiciary would impose duties on
articles for export or vessels moving between states, the Duties
Clauses 52 make clear that they disable not just Congress, but also the
President. Section 9 specifically disables Congress in two unique
instances: the Migration Clause provides that "[t]he Migration or
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress"; 53 the
Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clause emphasizes that "[nlo
[such] Law shall be passed. 54
The use of passive voice in Section 9 is a simple way of placing
in parallel form a series of disabilities, most of which apply to all
departments and some of which apply to only one department. Since
48. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1487 n.395 (1990) (discussing the use of different terms in
the First Amendment and the possibility of "elegant variation").
49. William Crosskey, however, argued that Section 9 applies to the states as well.
William Winslow Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution 625 n.* (U. Chicago, 1953) ("[The
Habeas Clause] seems to assure the general availability of the writ under the Constitution,
though that document nowhere provides for it").
50." Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243, 248 (1833).
51. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
52. Id. Art. I, § 9, cls. 5, 6.
53. Id. Art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
54. Id. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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no such distinction was required to disable the states, the Founders
wrote the Section 10 disabilities in parallel form and active voice. The
choice of stylistic forms allows the Founders to express complex rela-
tionships implicating federalism and separation of powers concepts
succinctly and efficiently.
B. The Structure of the Bill of Rights
1. The Second through Eighth Amendments: A Bill of Privileges and
Immunities
The Founders made similar structural and stylistic choices in
the Bill of Rights. First, we should observe that the Bill of Rights is
not a bill of rights in any Hohfeldian sense, in any sense that people
have claims enforceable against the government. 55 Amendments Two
through Eight are written as privileges and immunities, while the
First Amendment is a disability. In contrast to Section 9, which
consists of disabilities, Amendments Two through Eight grant
privileges or immunities to individuals.56  The various guarantees
protect "people" (Amendments II, IV, IX, and X), "person"
(Amendment V), "owner" (Amendment III), and "accused"
(Amendment VI).5 7
Take the Fourth Amendment as an example. It provides in
part: 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . .. -58 The right belongs to "the people," who are
immune from certain kinds of actions involving their persons, houses,
papers, and effects. But against whom is the immunity secured?
Who bears the correlative disability? The question is perhaps not as
obvious as it might first appear. We suspect from what we know
about the purposes for and structure of the original Constitution that
the guarantee is good at least against the federal government, but
nothing in the plain language of the Fourth Amendment restricts it to
55. Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness at 16-17 (cited in note 30). Professor Howe
points to two exceptions: the right of the accused to a speedy and public trial, and the right to a
jury trial in common law suits exceeding twenty dollars in value. Id. See U.S. Const., Amends.
vi, VII.
56. These are Hohfeld's " paucital" rights, or rights in personam. See note 29.
57. Some of these points were previously made, albeit more briefly, in Department of
Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General: Religious Liberty under the Free
Exercise Clause 15-16 (1986) ("Report to the Attorney General"). Lowell V. Sturgill and I were
the principal authors of that report.
58. U.S. Const., Amend. IV.
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the federal government. In the amendment's indistinct format, it
might just as easily apply to the states. One of the earliest
commentators, William Rawle, contended that most of the Bill of
Rights applied to the states.59 And a modem scholar, William
Crosskey, noting the differences in linguistic style within the Bill of
Rights, argued that "the only reasonable explanation for the variance
in form thus existing between the First Amendment and all the others
of the first eight is that the others were intentionally drawn in
general terms, in order to apply both to the nation and to the states."60
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of applying any of
Amendments Two through Eight to the states in Barron v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore.61 Barron brought suit against the City of
Baltimore under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, claim-
ing the city had diverted streams feeding the Patapsco River in such a
way that silt deposits rendered Barron's decedent's wharf unusable.
It is testimony to the uniqueness of the passive voice in which
Amendments Two through Eight are written that the Court even had
to decide against whom the Fifth Amendment was effective. Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court never did confront the lin-
guistic structure of the Fifth Amendment. Rather, the Court looked
to the structure of Article I, Sections 9 and 10, to show that the
Founders used very specific language when they wished to disable the
states. The Court announced that it would not depart from this "safe
and judicious course" without powerful evidence of "an intention to
59. Rawle, A View of the Constitution at 120-21, 127 (cited in note 38) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment is stated in "general terms which prohibit all violations of these personal
rights, and of course extend to both the state and the United States). See also William M.
Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 at 266-27 (Cornell
U., 1977) (discussing early theories that Amendments Two through Eight restrained state and
federal governments).
60. Crosskey, 2 Politics and the Constitution at 1058 (cited in note 49). If this was not the
First Congress's intention, Crosskey claims, "its draftsmanship of these amendments was
bungling, in an extreme degree." Id. Charles Fairman's response is found in Charles Fairman,
The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations on State Governmental Authority, 21 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 40, 71-72 (1953). See also Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 73 Yale L. J. 74, 77 (1963) ("If [a citizen] reads his Constitution, most of the Bill of
Rights is addressed at large, not expressly to the federal government alone"). Both Rawle and
Crosskey admitted, however, that the Seventh Amendment guarantee that facts tried by a jury
shall not be "re-examined in any Court of the United States" did not apply to the states.
Crosskey, 2 Politics and the Constitution at 1058 (cited in note 49); Rawle, A View of the
Constitution at 135 (cited in note 38). Rawle also considered the Sixth Amendment applicable to
the federal government alone. Id. at 128.
61. 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243 (1833).
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apply them to the State governments. '62  More persuasively, Chief
Justice Marshall recalled that the states adopted the amendments as
protection against federal encroachment, and he observed that at the
time of ratification the states had their own constitutional
guarantees. "Had Congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation
of improving the constitutions of the several States... they would
have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language."63
The Court undoubtedly decided Barron correctly. But why
then the ambiguity in the language? Why didn't the Founders state
the immunities in the Bill of Rights as disabilities and write them in
active voice? The Founders could just have easily stated "Congress
shall not violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." The answer may well be that the Founders wrote the
amendments in passive voice to ensure that they applied to the
executive and judicial departments as well. In fact, especially with
respect to the Fourth Amendment, citizens had more to fear from
collusion between the executive and judicial departments-constable
and magistrate-than from Congress. The Founders thus intended
that the amendments secure rights of people, persons, owners, etc.,
against all of the departments of the federal government.6
Not only is this theory consistent with the structure of the
rights secured in Article I, Section 9, but it is consistent with the way
in which James Madison proposed amendments to the First Congress.
Madison recommended that his proposed amendments be included in
the various articles of the Constitution to which they naturally be-
62. Id. at 249-50. Chief Justice Marshall, as was his custom, did not offer historical
references to support his statements. He may have had in mind the arguments between the
federalists and anti-federalists over the need for a declaration of rights when Congress was not
granted power to affect such matters.
63. Id. at 250. See Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 Howard) 84, 90 (1858) ("[S]o full, so
emphatic, and conclusive, is the doctrine of this court [in Barron].. . that it would seem to
require nothing less than an effort to unsettle the most deliberate and best-considered conclu-
sions of the court, to attempt to shake or disturb that doctrine"); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 Howard)
410, 434-35 (1847) ("[It is neither probable nor credible that the States should have anxiously
insisted to ingraft upon the federal constitution restrictions upon their own author-
ity,-restrictions which some of the States regard as the sine qua non of its adoption by them'.
See generally G. Edward White, The Marshall Court & Cultural Change, 1815-1835 at 589-93
(MacMillan, 1988) (analyzing Justice Marshall's decision in Barron); David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 887, 964-69 (1982) (analyzing Barron and comparing it to Justice Marshall's other
decisions). As Professor Currie notes, Chief Justice Marshall's conclusion was the accepted, but
not universal, wisdom of the day. Currie, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 967-68 & nn. 545-48.
64. See, for example, Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 Howard)
272, 276 (1855) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause "is a restraint on
the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government').
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longed; accordingly, most of what became the Bill of Rights would
have been added to Section 9, and not left free-standing at the end of
the Constitution.65 Had they done so, the Founders would have made
it indisputable that the people held the immunities against the fed-
eral government alone. Madison simply placed his proposed amend-
ments in the same form as Section 9 to which they would have
properly belonged. As it was, Chief Justice Marshall understood that
locating the new amendments at the end of the document, rather than
integrating them into the Constitution, did not affect their substance.
2. The First Amendment: A Congressional Disability
The First Amendment is unique, not only among the Bill of
Rights, but also among any of the disabilities66 found in the body of
the Constitution. The First Amendment is the plainest federal dis-
ability in the Constitution, much closer to the form of Section 10 than
to Section 9 or to the other amendments. Amendments Three through
Eight address boundaries between the federal government and indi-
viduals, made necessary because the quartering of soldiers, searching
of homes, holding persons for crimes, and conducting of criminal and
civil trials concerned sovereign powers granted to the new govern-
ment.6 7 The Founders did not expect the government to govern with-
out holding at least some ordinary police powers; thus, a declaration
of the rights of citizens with respect to the inherent powers of the
government was both necessary and inevitable. 68 The new govern-
ment, pursuant to its war powers, might quarter soldiers in peace, but
it could not do so without the consent of the owner.69 It might conduct
searches and seizures, but only if they were reasonable and after the
proper issuing of a warrant.70 In the conduct of criminal trials it must
65. Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights And What It Means Today 33-38 (U. Okla.,
1957).
66. Professor Mayton, employing Hohfeld's terminology, calls the First Amendment a "no-
power." William T. Mayton, "Buying-Up Speech': Active Government and the Terms of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, 3 Win. & Mary Bill of Rights L. J. 373, 376-77 & n.17, 390 n.71
(1994).
67. See Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretative Theory of the Ninth Amendment,
69 Ind. L. J. 759, 846 (1994) (stating that Amendments Two through Eight "cap governments'
legitimate powers').
68. See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946) ("[The Takings Clause] is a
tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take private property for public use, rather than a
grant of new power).
69. U.S. Const., Amend. III.
70. Id. Amend. V.
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afford due process, an impartial jury, and the opportunity to confront
witnesses and to enjoy the assistance of counsel71 These privileges
and immunities are a kind of procedural right-they do not restrain
the government from acting in a particular area, but restrain the way
the government conducts its legitimate functions.
A statement of the relationship between government and peo-
ple regarding religion, speech, press, and petition, however, is not a
declaration of boundaries in the same kind of zero-sum game. The
First Amendment is a subject-matter disability, as opposed to a pro-
cedural disability.72 Instead of qualifying the conduct of governmental
affairs, it puts a category of laws beyond the competence of Congress.
The disability is so complete that Congress is expressly forbidden to
enact laws respecting an establishment of religion, or laws abridging
the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech and press, and the
right to petition the government.73 The First Amendment is a rule
about rules.74
71. Id. Amends. V, VI.
72. The First Amendment "impose[s] upon the federal government a political duty rather
than to confer upon the citizen a constitutional right ...." Joseph M. Snee, Religious
Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 Wash. U. L. Q. 371, 373 (footnote
omitted). Alexander Hamilton distinguished between reservation of rights and rights not
surrendered. The rights expressed in the proposed Bill of Rights were, in his view, of the latter
variety: "[reservation of rights] have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon
the power of the people... the people surrender nothing, and as they retain every thing, they
have no need of particular reservations." Federalist 84 (Hamilton), in Cooke, ed., The Federalist
Papers at 578 (cited in note 25). See Herbert J. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights,
in Robert A. Goldwin and William Schambra, eds., How Does the Constitution Secure Rights?
26-27 (Amer. Enterprise Inst., 1985) (observing that the Federalists saw the Constitution as
merely granting limited powers to government, thus making the reservation of rights in the Bill
of Rights a redundancy).
73. By contrast, the rights secured in the remaining amendments do not forbid the pas-
sage of laws to define the rights conferred. The Third Amendment contemplates that the
quartering of soldiers in time of war be done "in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. Const.,
Amend. III. Congress has, in fact, promulgated laws defining rights found in the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. See, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994) (defining who can serve a war-
rant in federal searches and seizures); id. § 3501 (regulating the admissability of confessions);
id. §§ 6002-05 (providing rules for witness immunity). See also Department of Justice, Office of
Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Law of Pretrial Interrogation, 22 U. Mich. J.
L. Ref. 437, 512-21 (1989) (discussing § 3501).
At least some commentators believe that Congress, independent of its Fourteenth Amend-
ment powers, can also make rules for religious liberty. See Crosskey, 2 Politics and the
Constitution at 1057 (cited in note 49); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 Yale L. J. 1193, 1273 (1992). But see Snee, 1954 Wash. U. L. Q. at 388-89
(cited in note 72) (arguing that Congress was powerless to interfere if states prohibited free
exercise of religion).
74. The phrase belongs to John Harrison, who has also been known to refer to the First
Amendment as a "meta-rule."
First Amendment rights create "multital" rights, or rights in rem. See note 29. The practice
of empowering or disabling Congress generally creates multital liabilities, privileges, or immu-
nities. However, once Congress is disabled from doing something it is irrelevant who the
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If the First Amendment is a disability, who is possessed of the
correlative immunity? The Petition Clause does not keep us in sus-
pense, for it refers to the "right of the people." We assume that the
people (considered individually or collectively) are the primary benefi-
ciaries of the prohibitions against congressional laws respecting
establishment of religion, prohibiting the free exercise of religion, and
abridging the freedom of speech and press. But we have learned to
expect more from the Constitution. Had the First Amendment been
written as a right of the people ('The right of the people to the free
exercise of religion, freedom of speech and press, and to assemble to
petition the government for a redress of grievances shall not be vio-
lated") we would ask who was disabled. And the matter, following
Barron, would be clear-as with Amendments Two through Eight, the
First Amendment would disable the national government. 75 But that
is not what the Amendment says. It says "Congress shall make no
law." If we have been correct in our parsing of the other provisions in
the text, it should not surprise us to discover that the First
Amendment protected not only people, but states, and, curiously
enough, preserved power in the federal judiciary. 76
a. "Congress" as Congress, and not the states
The federalism component of the First Amendment is, of
course, well-documented. "Congress" meant "Congress" and not the
"states." By the time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights, every state
intended beneficiaries of the clause were; the disability is absolute and works to the benefit of
everyone. If the clause names both the party disabled and the party immune, then the
disability would be a paucital disability because the disabled party is disabled only as against
the party bearing the immunity.
This may help explain the Court's difficulty in dealing with First Amendment standing
questions, in particular those brought under the Establishment Clause. Compare, for example,
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), where the Court
denied standing to respondents who challenged the constitutionality of a statute allowing the
conveyance of federal property to a religious group, with Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968),
where the Court gave standing to petitioners who challenged a statute allowing the
disbursement of federal funds to religious schools. Since the First Amendment disables
Congress, the stakeholders in such cases include, literally, everyone. For a similar reading, see
Robert C. Palmer, Akhil Amar: Elitist Populist and Anti-textual Textualist, 16 S.I.U. L. J. 397,
398-400 (1992) ('The Establishment Clause was only a prohibition of congressional powers....
inhere is no explicit right holder in the Establishment Clause).
75. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, 420 (1819) (asserting that, had the
founders intended to restrict Congress's use of the Necessary and Proper Clause, it "would have
been expressed in terms resembling these. 'In carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and
all others ... no laws shall be passed but such as are necessary and proper").
76. See note 105 and accompanying text.
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had been through the process of drafting and ratifying some kind of
declaration of fundamental rights. 7 Every state except Connecticut
had adopted some kind of guarantee of religious freedom78 Most
states had also guaranteed freedom of speech, press, and petition79
The Founders' debates over the religion provisions8O show
careful attention to the question of the form of the amendment. On
August 15, 1789, the House Committee of the Whole considered the
proposition "no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the
equal rights of conscience be infringed." 1 Peter Sylvester spoke first,
concerned that the "mode of expression" might "abolish religion alto-
gether."8 2 James Madison replied that he understood the proposal to
77. Robert Allen Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791 at 41-77
(Northeastern U., 1983).
78. See Report to the Attorney General at 88-104 (cited in note 57) (compiling state guar-
antees of free exercise). The guarantees offered by the states varied widely, however. In
Virginia, the minority Baptists had found sympathetic ears in Jefferson and Madison, who
spurred the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776. Pennsylvania followed, and others followed
Pennsylvania. Id. at 5-6. Massachusetts still had an established church, the Congregational
Church. See Jacob C. Meyer, Church and State in Massachusetts, from 1740 to 1833 at 30-31
(Russell & Russell, 1968). South Carolina on the other hand established the "Christian
Protestant religion," without expressing a preference for any particular Protestant sect. S.C.
Const. of 1778, Art. XXXVII.
The delegates representing these states were generally agreed that Congress should make
no law respecting religion, but there was no consensus-and no occasion or attempt to reach
consensus-as to what any particular state, or the states generally, should do. Delegates were
more than willing to maintain the status quo, permitting each state to choose for itself the best
course, so long as the remaining states did not try to enforce a single rule.
79. By 1789, nine states had press clauses guaranteeing freedom of the press. See David
A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 U.C.LA L. Rev. 455, 464-66 (1983). See also
id. at 538-41 (listing state provisions); Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First
Amendment, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1156, 1173-74 n.80 (1986) (summarizing state constitutional
protections).
80. We do not have the benefit of the discussions over the form of the speech, press, and
petition provisions. The House draft read: "The freedom of speech and of the press, and the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to the
Government for the redress of grievances, shall not be infringed." 1 The Debates and
Proceedings in the Congress of the United States 731 (Gales & Seaton, 1834) ("Annals of Cong.")
(Aug. 15, 1789). Because the debates of 1789 are found in two different reports, each with its
own pagination, this Article follows the citation of volume one with the exact date. The Senate
put the amendment in the form "Congress shall make no law...." 1 Journal of the Senate 104
(1789) (Glazier, 1977) ("Senate Journal"). The form was consistent with the religion clauses,
and the two proposed amendments were eventually combined in one. Anderson, 30 U.C.L. L.
Rev. at 477-82 (cited in note 79).
81. 1 Annals of Cong. at 729 (cited in note 80) (Aug. 15, 1789). For discussion of the
debates, see Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms 193-222 (Oxford U., 1986); Michael J. Malbin,
Religion and Politics: The Intentions of the Authors of the First Amendment 3-17 (Amer.
Enterprise Inst., 1978); Rodney K. Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A
Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and
A Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 Wake Forest L. Rev. 569, 604-20 (1984).
See also Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2668-70, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92-104 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. 1 Annals of Cong. at 729 (cited in note 80) (Aug. 15, 1789).
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mean "Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any man-
ner contrary to their conscience. 83 Benjamin Huntington agreed with
Madison's interpretation, but feared that "others might.., put an-
other construction upon it."' 4 Madison then suggested adding the
word "national" before the term "religion."85 Massachusetts delegate
Elbridge Gerry objected to the term "national" because it justified the
anti-federalists' claim that "this form of Government consolidated the
union," creating a national government rather than a federal one.86
Samuel Livermore recommended that the proposal read, "Congress
shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of con-
science"87-language very similar to a proposal originally submitted
by the New Hampshire ratifying convention.88
Two days later the Committee considered inserting a different
proposition in Article I, Section 10: "[N]o State shall infringe the
equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... 89  Thomas Tucker of South Carolina opposed the
proposition on the grounds that it would be "much better.., to leave
the State Governments to themselves and not to interfere with them
more than we already do." 90 Madison objected that this was "the most
valuable amendment on the whole list" and that it was "equally
necessary" to secure these rights against the states.91 The
amendment survived in the House, only to have the Senate vote it
down.
On August 20, the amendment moved closer to its present
form. Without recorded explanation or discussion, the House ap-
proved Fisher Ames's motion to change the proposal to read,
"Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the
free exercise thereof, or to infringe the right of conscience.92 As in the
House, the Senate debates were "a discussion about style, not
83. Id. at 730.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 731.
86. Id. The term "national" was particularly inflammatory and appears nowhere in the
original Constitution. See Malbin, Religion and Politics at 10 (cited in note 81).
87. 1 Annals of Cong. at 731 (cited in note 80) (Aug. 15, 1789).
88. 1 Elliot's Debates at 326 (cited in note 4).
89. 1 Annals of Cong. at 755 (cited in note 80) (Aug. 17, 1789).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 766 (Aug. 20, 1789).
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substance" in which "the Senate manifested its concern for form."9 3
While the Senate amended the "rights of conscience" language, it
maintained the form "Congress shall make no law.' 4
The House and Senate Conference approved in large measure
the Ames proposal, with one significant change. It added the words
"respecting an establishment of religion" in place of "establishing
religion.''ss This change broadened the scope of the First Amendment
to satisfy the concerns of the anti-federalists because the term
"respecting an establishment" not only prohibited Congress from
making laws which tended to establish religion, but prohibited sec-
ond-tier laws about the establishment of religion96 The latter
ensured that Congress could not dis-establish religion any more than
it could establish it;97 it placed the matter of religious establishment
beyond Congress's competence. The state ratifying conventions
offered little commentary on the new First Amendment. 98 The records
we have suggest the First Amendment applied only to Congress, and
the general lack of interest confirms that the Founders had success-
fully deferred the difficult questions of the content of freedom of ex-
pression to other fora, the states.99
b. "Congress" as Congress, and not the federal judiciary
Less obvious, but equally important, is the proposition that the
Founders meant "Congress" and not the President or the federal judi-
ciary. The point has been infrequently noted,100 and even where
93. Curry, The First Freedoms at 213 (cited in note 81).
94. 1 Senate Journal at 104 (cited in note 80); Malbin, Religion and Politics at 12-13 (cited
in note 81).
95. Malbin, Religion and Politics at 13 (cited in note 81).
96. Id. at 15; Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause 95 (Macmillan, 1986).
97. This observation has been made by a number of commentators. See, for example,
Crosskey, 2 Politics and the Constitution at 1074 (cited in note 49); Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311, 321-22 (1986); Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., The
Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the
First Amendment, 2 Washburn L. J. 65, 85 (1962); Snee, 1954 Wash. U. L. Q. at 385 (cited in
note 72).
98. See Chester J. Antien, Arthur T. Downey, and Edward C. Roberts, Freedom from
Federal Establishment 145 (Bruce Pub., 1964) (quoting Journal of the Senate of Virginia for
1789 at 51) (the First Amendment "goes to restrain Congress...'). See also id. at 153 (quoting
Robert C. Cotner, ed., Theodore Foster's Minutes of the Convention... at South Kingston, Rhode
Island, in March, 1790 at app.93-98 (1929)) (echoing Madison's suggestion that if Congress
cannot make laws respecting religion, states should not be able to either).
99. Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early
American History 224-33 (Harvard U., 1963).
100. The most important work on this point to date is Professor Denbeaux's, The First
Word of the First Amendment, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1156 (cited in note 79). See also Report to the
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noted, it is often assumed to be of no consequence. 101 That it was
significant is evident from Representative Huntington's response to
Madison's proposal, which began "no religion shall be established by
law .... ,,102 Huntington protested that this language might be
"extremely hurtful to the cause of religion"103 because it might forbid
federal courts from enforcing contracts between ministers and their
congregations. According to Huntington:
The Ministers of their congregations to the Eastward were maintained by the
contributions of those who belonged to their society; the expense of building
meeting-houses was contributed in the same manner. These things were regu-
lated by by-laws. If an action was brought before a Federal Court on any of
these cases, the person who had neglected to perform his engagements could
Attorney General at 17 n.25 (cited in note 57); Leo Pfeffer, Church, State & Freedom 115-16
(Beacon Press, 1953); Palmer, 16 S.I.U. L. J. at 400 n.15 (cited in note 74); Leonard W. Levy, On
the Origins of the Press Clause, 32 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 177, 206-07 (1984); Alexander Meildejohn,
What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 461,465 (1953).
101. See, for example, Pfeffer, Church, Stqte & Freedom at 117 (cited in note 100) (stating
that there is "no indication in any of the debates or writings that the purpose of the stylistic
change was to leave the executive and judicial branches of government free of the restriction
imposed on the Congress'); Levy, Legacy of Suppression at 233-34 (cited in note 99) ("[Ihe
prohibition on power was imposed exclusively upon Congress," but "the Framers did not say
what they meant"); Amar, 101 Yale L. J. at 1274 (cited in note 73) ('To be sure, the Amendment
speaks only of 'Congress'; but any... inference that citizens therefore lack analogous rights
against the President or federal judges--or states-flies in the face of the Ninth Amendment');
Anderson, 30 U.C.LA. L. Rev. at 501 (cited in note 79) ('it is conceivable... that addition of the
reference to Congress had no significance whatsoever). See also Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 70 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) ('CThe amendments embodying the Bill of Rights were
intended to curb all branches of the Federal Government in the fields touched by the
amendments--Legislative, Executive and Judicial.... [C]onstitutional limitations of courts'
powers were, in the view of the Founders, essential supplements to the First Amendment");
Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cases 408, 427 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (holding that the First Amendment
"wholly prohibits the action of the legislative or judicial power of the Union on the subject
matter of a religious establishment, or any restraint on the free exercise of religion").
Leonard Levy seems to have backed away from his original conclusion. See Leonard W.
Levy, Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson lv (Bobbs-Merrill, 1966) (asserting that the
First Amendment applies to Congress only); Leonard W. Levy, The Legacy Reexamined, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 767, 767 (1985) (same); Levy, 32 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 206-07 (cited in note 100)
(same).
102. 1 Annals of Cong. at 729 (cited in note 80) (Aug. 15, 1789). Virginia originally pro-
posed that the freedom of the press "cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by
any authority of the United States." 3 Elliot's Debates at 656 (cited in note 4) (emphasis added).
From this, Levy concludes that the change to "Congress" was deliberate. See, for example,
Levy, 32 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 207 (cited in note 100).
103. 1 Annals of Cong. at 730 (Aug. 15, 1789) (cited in note 80).
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not be compelled to do it; for a support of ministers or building of places of
worship might be construed into a religious establishment.
04
Livermore followed shortly with the proffer of "Congress shall make
no law."
The Founders' insertion of the word "Congress" was "an inten-
tional act, specifically designed to assure that the federal courts,
unlike Congress, could act without constitutional restriction. ''105
While members of the House were concerned with the relationship
between Congress and religion, the Senate apparently had broader
concerns and imported the disabilities on "Congress" to press and
speech. 10 6 Even this change was not poor drafting, but a conscious
attempt to forestall legislative prior restraints of speech, while leav-
ing the judiciary free to issue injunctive prior restraints when equity
so required.'0 7 At the same time, the lack of a disability on the judici-
ary would have permitted federal courts to enforce state guarantees of
freedom of religion and expression in cases properly within their
jurisdiction.
104. Id. See Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness at 22-23 (cited in note 30) (arguing that
the House intended to disable only Congress so as not to "deprive the federal courts of power to
respect state law when it happened to sustain a religious enterprise).
105. Denbeaux, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1169 (cited in note 79). See Levy, Freedom of the
Press at lvii-lviii (cited in note 101) (maintaining that courts had Article III jurisdiction even
though Congress could not enact a law against the press). See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights
and Structure in Constitutional Theory, 8 Soc. Phil. & Poly. 196, 199, 211-14 (1991). The First
Amendment would theoretically free the executive to infringe free exercise, speech, press, and
petition rights. But there is almost no threat in the executive because the President's so-called
enumerated powers provide no occasion to infringe such rights and his Take Care re-
sponsibilities, U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, derive from the powers of Congress. See Denbeaux,
80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1158 n.1 (cited in note 79). See also Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President:
Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 Yale L. J. 51, 98-103 (1994)
(discussing the relationship between Congress and the Take Care Clause and the President's
enumerated powers).
106. 1 Senate Journal at 70-71 (cited in note 80). See Denbeaux, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1169-
70 (cited in note 79) (asserting that the Senate extended protection to speech and press as well
as religion); Anderson, 30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 481 (cited in note 79) (maintaining that the
Senate included speech and press in the domain of protection).
107. Denbeaux, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1173, 1176, 1192, 1196, 1201 (cited in note 79). As
Professor Denbeaux observes, "during the prerevolutionary colonial era and during the precon-
stitutional period, the main threat to freedom of speech was not from the courts, but from the
legislature." Id. at 1173-74. But see 4 Elliot's Debates at 541 (cited in note 4) (quoting the
Kentucky Resolution of 1798, which was drafted by Thomas Jefferson) ("[Llibels, falsehood, and
defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance of federal
tribunals'.
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3. Reconciling Text and Theory
It is an irony of the First Amendment that matters such as
religious freedom, free speech, and the press-matters which have
proven so divisive to us-should have been the object of so little dis-
agreement among the Founders. Despite deep differences between
federalists and anti-federalists over the need for a Constitution, they
at least agreed that, given a constitution creating a federal govern-
ment, the new government did not possess "a shadow of right... to
intermeddle with religion."108 The disagreement was whether the
Constitution should say so. James Madison, 109 Alexander Hamilton,10
and others"' contended that since Congress had been granted no
power to establish a religion or to restrict freedom of religious
exercise, speech, and press, no bill of rights was necessary. Hamilton
warned that a bill of rights was "not only unnecessary... but
dangerous. [It] would contain various exceptions to powers which are
not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext
to claim more than were granted." 2
Madison recognized the political expediency of acquiescing to
the demands for a bill of rights in order to secure ratification of the
Constitution.1 Because he continued to believe the federal govern-
ment lacked any power to address religion, speech, or press, he had
little incentive to be terribly attentive to the language of the new
108. 3 Elliot's Debates at 330 (cited in note 4) (statement of James Madison).
109. Id.
110. Federalist 84 (Hamilton), in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 578-80 (cited in note
25).
111. 4 Elliot's Debates at 194 (cited in note 4) (statement of James Iredell); 3 Elliot's
Debates at 469 (statement of Edmund Randolph) ("No part of the Constitution, even if strictly
construed, will justify a conclusion that the general government can take away or impair the
freedom of religion"). For a similar argument, see Max Farrand, ed., 2 The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 at 617-18 (Yale U., 1937) (statement of Roger Sherman) (opposing a
guarantee of "liberty of the Press": "It is unnecessary-The power of Congress does not extend
to the Pres").
112. Federalist 84 (Hamilton), in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 679 (cited in note 25).
He emphasized that a bill of rights might afford
a plausible pretence for claiming that pcwer. They might urge with a semblance of rea-
son, that the constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing
against the abuse of an authority, which was not given, and that the provision against
restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe
proper regulations concerning it, was intended to be vested in the national government.
Id. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress,
1789-1791, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 853 (1994).
113. For an interesting related discussion, see Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning
of the Ninth Amendment, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1215, 1248-51 (1990) (discussing Federalist con-
cerns over enumerated rights).
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amendment.14  For Madison, it was more important that the dele-
gates reach some agreement than that they reach a precise result.
Moreover, the form of the new amendment eliminated the need for
agreement among the delegates as to the substance of religious liberty
or freedom of expression; they simply reduced their various views to
their least common denominator, that Congress would lack the power
to affect the content of religious liberty in the states.1 5 This history
also explains why Madison considered the proposed amendment
forbidding the states from interfering with religious liberties to be the
"most valuable" proposal on the list.116 In Madison's view, our First
Amendment only confirmed Congress's lack of an enumerated power
over religion and expression. A restraint on the states, however, was
the one guarantee that would have actually worked a substantive
change in the structure of the Constitution.
The First Amendment was a promise to people and states of
non-interference with the content of religious and expressive freedom
and establishment in the states. While the Establishment Clause
quite clearly prohibited Congress from enacting any laws "respecting"
establishment, the Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Free Press
Clauses seemed to disallow only such laws as "prohibit[ed]" or
"abridg[ed]" those freedoms," 7 a difference which, we will see, was
seized upon in the Sedition Act debates.118 The Amendment also re-
114. See Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution 179-80
(MacMillan, 1988) (noting that Madison routinely misquoted the First Amendment); Malbin,
Religion and Politics at 8 (cited in note 81) (observing that Madison sometimes misquoted his
own proposed amendments). See also Curry, The First Freedoms at 216 (cited in note 81)
("Because it was making explicit the non-existence of a power,... Congress approached the
subject in a somewhat hasty and absentminded manner. To examine the two clauses of the
amendment as a carefully worded analysis of Church-State relations would be to overburden
them").
115. Jefferson characterized the First Amendment as securing exclusive power in the
states. In the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, which Jefferson authored, he argued that
the absence of delegated power to Congress, plus the First and Tenth Amendments, 'manifested
[the states] determination to retain to themselves the right of judging how far the licentious-
ness of speech, and of the press, may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom." 4
Elliot's Debates at 540-41 (cited in note 4). See also Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural
Address (March 4, 1805), in James D. Richardson, ed., 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents
366, 367-68 (Bureau of National Literature, 1912) ("In matters of religion I have considered that
its free exercise is placed by the Constitution independent of the powers of the General
Government. I have therefore undertaken on no occasion to prescribe the religious exercises
suited to it, but have left them, as the Constitution found them, under the direction and
discipline of the church or state authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies").
116. 1 Annals of Cong. at 755 (cited in note 80) (Aug. 17, 1789). This may also explain why
Madison was so imprecise in his subsequent references to the amendment.
117. See McConnell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1485-88 (cited in note 48) (discussing the use of
the two different terms); Report to the Attorney General at 17-19 (cited in note 57) (same).
118. See notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
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flects a broader sentiment, one not shared by more liberal thinkers
such as Jefferson or Madison, that religion, in order to prosper, re-
quired the encouragement and support of government. 119 As Joseph
Story put it, "it is the especial duty of government to foster and en-
courage [Christianity] among all the citizens and subjects.120 The
Founders had no intention of broaching the difficult and divisive
question of the role of state and local government in the promotion of
religion. There were obvious regional and sectarian differences that
the Founders simply avoided altogether. The Founders had their
substantive views of church and state, of course, but they did not
codify their views in the Bill of Rights. Thus, no coherent theory of
the religious liberty or freedom of expression can be drawn from the
text or the history of the First Amendment; such questions were de-
liberately deferred to the states. The First Amendment was the least
common denominator; it was simply jurisdictional.121
From the states' perspective, the First Amendment success-
fully codified the lack of federal power over state-church relations.
For them the principal guarantee was the Establishment Clause.
Religious establishment and religious free expression were inextrica-
bly connected in the states. Whatever freedom in religious practices
the states guaranteed was subject to the state's decision to establish
religion, in varying degrees. In other words, the free exercise of
religion in the states was subject to whatever orthodoxy in religious
practices the state prescribed. If Congress was forbidden to interfere
with the establishment or disestablishment of religion, it was
effectively prohibited from interfering with state laws granting or
119. See Curry, The First Freedoms at 203 (cited in note 81) (discussing Huntington's
argument that because religion was necessary for a civil society, the states should promote it,
and that doing so was acceptable so long as no one was forced to pay to support a religion other
than his own); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 at 427-28 (U.
N.C., 1969) (observing that Massachusetts intentionally promoted and encouraged religion for
the good of the people); Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness at 26-29 (cited in note 30) (noting
that religion often received promotion from the government). Mark DeWolfe Howe concludes
that "the federalism of the First Amendment may be even more important than its
libertarianism." Id. at 29.
120. Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution § 1871 at 661 (Little, Brown, 3rd.
ed. 1858). See also id. §§ 1867-68 at 724-26; Joseph Story, A Familiar Exposition of the
Constitution of the United States § 444 (Harper & Row, 1859) (asserting that governmental
encouragement of religion was essential); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49 (1815)
(commenting that although all men are entitled to the free exercise of religion, the legislature
should be able to promote all sects of religion by giving the sects corporate rights).
121. Smith, Foreordained Failure at 18-26 (cited in note 17).
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restricting free exercise as well.122 Since there was no disability
analogous to the Establishment Clause for press and speech, it is
questionable whether the First Amendment dispossessed Congress of
any power to pass laws respecting speech and press. For such
guarantees the states would have to rely on the absence of power
conferred in Article I, not on the First Amendment. 23
In sum, the Founders' First Amendment reaffirmed, above all
else, exclusive state control of religious freedom. It also guaranteed
the freedom of expression against federal suppression. Additionally,
it ensured that the federal judiciary was not prevented from enforcing
obligations under state law affecting religious organizations, free
exercise of religion, and freedom of speech and press.124 Those
objectives could not have been better achieved than through a
provision which began "Congress shall make no law .... "
122. Id. at 36-37. The Free Exercise Clause was not, in the main, a guarantee to the states
of non-interference with their free exercise laws; that was accomplished through the
Establishment Clause. Nonetheless, the Free Exercise Clause served an essential, although
unacknowledged function. It guaranteed federal religious freedom with respect to those things
over which Congress legitimately exercised exclusive power: the military, the territories, and
the District of Columbia. See, for example, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 50 (1986)
(military); Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1 (1890) (territories); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (District of Columbia).
See also Smith, Foreordained Failure at 27 (cited in note 17) (discussing the view that
Congress's retention of power over religion in the territories and the District of Columbia estab-
lished a "substantive right or principle of religious freedom applicable to the national govern-
ment ); McConnell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1477-79 (cited in note 48) (discussing the fear of the
free exercise amendment proponents that Congress would exercise "plenary regulatory author-
ity" over religion in the territories, the District of Columbia, and the military). The Court noted
in Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheaton) at 426, that there were acts beyond Congress's powers when
directed against the states that were within Congress's powers when directed to the District of
Columbia or the territories. See also United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wallace) 41, 44-45
(1869) (holding that the regulation of internal state trade was outside of congressional power
except where Congress's legislative authority is exclusive, as in the District of Columbia).
123. This view is, perhaps, not as naive as it might seem. Professor Mayton, for instance,
suggests that the Treason Clause, U.S. Const., Art. III, § 3, omitted reference to constructive
treason, and "thereby bar[red] the federal government from making dissident speech a crime."
William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84
Colum. L. Rev. 91, 115 (1984). See also id. at 118 (discussing the Copyright Clause as the sole
exception to the prohibition on Congress's power to interfere with freedom of press).
124. See note 105.
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C. The First Amendment in the Interregnum: Government Disability
or Personal Privilege?
1. The First Amendment in Congress: The Sedition Act Debates
Madison's carefully knit coalition unraveled quickly in debates
over the Sedition Act of 1798,125 as new interpretations crept into
discourse on the First Amendment. The Federalists, seeking to shield
themselves and President John Adams from criticism, argued that the
measure of Congress's power to pass the Act was whether seditious
utterings were comprehended in the term "freedom of speech, or of
the press." The Federalists found ample power in the Necessary and
Proper Clause to punish seditious libel. 126 The First Amendment, the
Federalists argued, did not confirm the absence of enumerated power
to legislate on the subject of speech and press, but was an independ-
ent disability, and one that protected individuals, not states. "This
freedom... is nothing more than the liberty of writing, publishing,
and speaking, one's thoughts, under the condition of being answerable
to the injured party, whether it be the Government or an
individual ... )127 Accordingly, the national government "must [not]
be indebted to and dependent on an individual State for its
protection .... -128 The Federalists claimed that the Sedition Act was
"perfectly harmless" as a federal analog of state statutes: it
"contain[ed] no provision which is not practised upon under the laws
of the several States... from which [the Founders] had drawn most
of their ideas ofjurisprudence. ''129
The outnumbered Republicans vociferously opposed the meas-
ure, but resisted arguing the matter on the Federalist's terms. The
real issue for the Republicans was not what comprised the freedoms
of speech and press, but whether Congress had any power at all in
these areas. Any law might incidentally affect speech and press, but
125. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596. The Sedition Act made criminal the "writing,
printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against
the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or
the President of the United States, with intent to defame ...." Id. at 596-97.
126. 2 Annals of Cong., 5th Cong., 2d Sess 2167 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harper) ("[Clan
the powers of a Government be carried into execution, if sedition for opposing its laws, and
libels against its officers, itself, and its proceedings, are to pass unpunished?'.
127. Id. at 2148 (statement of Rep. Otis).
128. Id. at 2146.
129. Id. at 2145. See id. at 2147-48 (citing examples of state regulation of political speech).
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the Sedition Act was, after all, a law about speech and press, and that
Congress had no power to enact. "[W]hen the Constitution had not an
express provision on the subject of the liberty of the press, the under-
standing of the members of the convention was complete on the sub-
ject... ," but to make matters clear Congress and the states added
"the most express terms" in the form of the First Amendment.30
Republicans admitted that states did have similar libel laws, but far
from showing that the national government possessed the same
power, as the Federalists had argued, it demonstrated that the na-
tional government was dependent on the states for protection. 131
Finally, the Republicans pointed out that the Sedition Act conflicted
with the separation of functions; that whatever power federal courts
might have to enforce the common law of libel, Congress was forbid-
den to legislate here. 3 2 Despite Republican arguments, the Sedition
Act passed along party lines. 133
The Sedition Act spawned vigorous objection from Virginia and
Kentucky, which urged its repeal. In the Virginia debates, John
Marshall took up the Federalists' arguments, although he found
himself in the minority. According to Marshall, the amendment itself
was proof of the existence of Congress's power, since "[ilt would have
130. Id. at 2142, 2151-53, 2159-60 (statements of Rep. Nicholas, Rep. Macon, Rep.
Livingston, and Rep. Gallatin). See also 3 Annals of Cong., 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 3014 (1799)
(statement of Rep. Nicholas). Members argued that if Congress possessed the power to enact
the Sedition Act, it might as well establish a national religion. 2 Annals of Cong. at 2151, 2153
(cited in note 126) (statements of Rep. Macon and Rep. Livingston).
Rep. Gallatin addressed specifically the claim that Congress found its power in the
Necessary and Proper Clause:
[The Necessary and Proper Clause] was strict and precise; it gave not a vague power,
arbitrarily, to create offenses against Government, or to take cognizance of cases which
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State courts. In order to claim any authority
under this clause, the supporters of this bill must show the specific power given to
Congress or to the President, by some other part of the Constitution ....
[Tihe bill now under discussion justified the suspicions of those who, at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, had apprehended that the sense of that generally
expressed clause might be distorted for that purpose. It was in order to remove these
fears, that the [First] amendment ... was proposed and adopted.
Id. at 2159. See also 3 Annals of Cong. at 2994, 3003-05 (statement of Rep. Gallatin); 1 Annals
of Cong. at 730 (cited in note 80) (statement of James Madison) (Aug. 15, 1789); 4 Elliot's
Debates at 568, 573 (cited in note 4) (Madison's Report on Virginia's Resolution); Akhil Reed
Amar, Anti-Federalists, The Federalist Papers, and the Big Argument for Union, 16 Harv. J. L.
& Pub. Pol. 111, 115 (1993) (stating that the First Amendment "intentionally inverted the
language of the Necessary and Proper Clause").
131. 2 Annals of Cong. at 2151-54 (cited in note 126) (statements of Rep. Macon and Rep.
Livingston).
132. "The question was not whether the Courts of the United States had, without this law,
the power to punish libels, but whether, supposing they had not the power, Congress had that of
giving them this jurisdiction-whether Congress were vested by the Constitution with the
authority of passing this bill." Id at 2157-58 (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
133. Id. at 2171.
1568
1995] TAKING LIBERTIES 1569
been certainly unnecessary thus to have modified the legislative pow-
ers of Congress concerning the press, if the power itself does not
exist.''134 He then urged that the authors of the First Amendment,
having "well weighted" the different terms, "manifest a difference of
intention":
Congress is prohibited from making any law RESPECTING a religious estab-
lishment, but not from making any law RESPECTING the press. When the
power of Congress relative to the press is to be limited, the word
RESPECTING is dropt, and Congress is only restrained from the passing any
law ABRIDGING its liberty. This difference of expression to religion and the
press, manifests a difference of intention with respect to the power of the na-
tional legislature over those subjects, both in the person who drew, and in
those who adopted this amendment.135
Madison, the author of the Virginia Resolution, replied to Marshall
that Virginia ratified the original Constitution on the express under-
standing that "the liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be
cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by any authority of the
United States.1 36 'Words," Madison said, "could not well express, in a
fuller or more forcible manner... that the liberty of conscience and
freedom of the press were equally and completely exempted from all
authority whatever of the United States.'13 7 Jefferson, the author of
the Kentucky Resolution, stated:
[N]o power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the
press, being delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, all lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain,
and were reserved to the states, or to the people.138
134. John Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in Philip
B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 5 The Founders' Constitution 136, 137 (U. Chicago, 1987).
See also Case of Fries, 9 F. Cases 826, 839 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (James Iredell's charge to the
Grand Jury) ("[C]ongress may make a law respecting the press, provided the law be such as not
to abridge its freedom"), reprinted in Kurland and Lerner, 5 The Founders' Constitution at 140.
135. Marshall, Report of the Minority at 138 (cited in note 134).
136. 4 Elliot's Debates at 576 (cited in note 4) (quoting the Virginia Resolution). See also id.
at 572-73 (debating the constitutional effect of expressly excluding authority over the press from
the government).
137. Id. at 576. See Levy, Freedom of the Press at lvi-lvii (cited in note 101) (stating that
the amendment was intended to ensure that Congress would not use its delegated powers to
infringe upon the freedom of speech and of the press); McConnell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1487-88
(cited in note 48) (discussing the restrictive scope of the word "abridging" in the portions of the
First Amendment relating to freedom of speech and of the press).
138. 4 Elliot's Debates at 540 (cited in note 4). In a letter to Abigail Adams in 1804,
Jefferson referred to the Sedition Act and offered: "While we deny that Congress have a right to
controul the freedom of the press, we have ever asserted the right of the states, and their
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The House of Representatives referred the Kentucky and
Virginia Resolutions to a select committee, whose report echoed prior
arguments, and added that of John Marshall:
[In the First Amendment] is manifest that the Constitution intended to pro-
hibit Congress from legislating at all on the subject of religious establish-
ments, and the prohibition is made in the most express terms. Had the same
intention prevailed respecting the press, the same expressions would have
been used, and Congress would have been "prohibited from passing any law re-
specting the press." [Congress is] not, however, 'prohibited" from legislating at
all on the subject, but merely from abridging the liberty of the press. It is evi-
dent they may legislate respecting the press [and] may pass laws for its regu-
lation... provided those laws do not abridge its liberty.13 9
The Republican minority assailed the notion of a "boundary between
what is prohibited and what is permitted. The Constitution has fixed
no such boundary; therefore, they can pretend to no power over the
press, without claiming the right of defining what is freedom.' 140
Voting along party lines, Congress adopted a resolution finding it
"inexpedient" to repeal the Sedition Act.'4'
The legacy of the Sedition Act is a modest, but perceptible,
shift from viewing the First Amendment as confirming the total ab-
sence of congressional power over religion, speech, and press, to as-
suming that, like the remaining guarantees in the Bill of Rights, the
First Amendment conferred a personal privilege whose substantive
content could be defined142  As Mark DeWolfe Howe pointed out, "a
exclusive right, to do so." Quoted in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 522 n.4 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
139. 3 Annals of Cong. at 2990 (cited in note 130).
140. Id. at 3011 (statement of Rep. Nicholas). Rep. Nicholas argued that to distinguish
"abridging" from "respecting" as the Federalists had done "implie[d] that freedom of the press
was before limited," and, more significantly, that Congress possessed the same power to define
the right of petition to Congress itself. Id.
141. Id. at 2992-93 (outlining the resolution), 3016-17 (providing results of the vote).
142. As Professor Anderson noted, the Sedition Act was consistent with the separation of
powers component in the First Amendment in the sense that a criminal law was not a prior
constraint. But the Act was plainly inconsistent with the idea that "Congress had no legitimate
power to pass any law respecting the press." Anderson, 30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 522-23 (cited in
note 79). See L.A. Scot Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate and the Constitution: Freedom of the Press
in America 48 (U. Cal., 1991) (noting that in the Sedition Act debates, "the Supreme Court,
historians and lawyers would ask of the First Amendment a question it was not intended to
answer: what did the First Amendment say about the scope of freedom of the press? The First
Amendment was not intended to answer that question, because the question was left entirely to
the states"); Mayton, 84 Colum. L. Rev. at 124-25 (cited in note 123) (discussing the effect of the
Sedition Act debates on the subsequent construction of the First Amendment; Federalist
arguments "stood [the First Amendment] on its head'. See also Leonard W. Levy, 'Bill of
Rights," in Jack P. Greene, ed., 1 Encyclopedia of American Political History 104, 123
(Scribner's, 1984) ('CThe framers meant Congress to be totally without power to enact legislation
respecting the press, although the First Amendment does not say so').
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crisis which seems to us to have been concerned with freedom seemed
to the statesmen of 1798 to be a crisis in federalism,"'' 4 and, I would
add, in separation of powers. It emphasized the inevitability of defim-
ing the boundaries between Congress and the states and Congress
and the federal judiciary with respect to freedom of religion, speech,
and press. It was the beginning of a shift from seeing the First
Amendment as a governmental disability to a personal immunity,
from affirming an exclusive power in the states to stating a personal
privilege.
2. The First Amendment in the Supreme Court
Between ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 and ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there were few decisions
in the United States Supreme Court even mentioning the guarantees
of the First Amendment. The first Supreme Court decision to analyze
substantively any First Amendment guarantee was not until 1879 in
Reynolds v. United States.'"
Twelve years after the Supreme Court ruled in Barron that the
Fifth Amendment bound only the federal government, 4 5 the Court
heard its first claim to federal guarantees of religious freedom.146 In
143. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Book Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 189, 190 (1952) (reviewing John
C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts (Little, Brown, 1951)). See Walter
Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 S. Ct. Rev.
109, 121-22 (asserting that Republicans in Congress "were not contending for free speech and
press; they were contending for states' rights, for the right of the states to punish seditious
liber).
144. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). See text accompanying notes 299-302.
145. Barron was followed by Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 Howard) 84, 90 (1858)
(concerning the Fifth Amendment); Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 469, 551-52
(1833) (concerning the Ninth Amendment).
146. The Court had previously decided two cases affecting religious establishment, but not
involving the First Amendment. In Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815), the
Episcopal Church in Virginia, through Taylor, claimed title to real property that it had been
granted in 1776, but which had been the subject of incorporation in 1784. The law incorporating
the Episcopal Church was repealed in 1798 as "inconsistent with the principles of the constitu-
tion and of religious freedom," id. at 48, and in 1801 Virginia claimed the property of all
Episcopal churches. Terrett, representing Fairfax County, asserted a claim under the 1801
statute and sought to sell the lands for the benefit of the poor. The Court held for Taylor on the
grounds that the property properly belonged to the church in 1798, finding that by 1801 the
church's property no longer lay within Virginia, but belonged to the County of Alexandria in the
new District of Columbia. Id. at 52-55.
The Court also rejected the claim that the acts returning title to the church violated
Virginia's bill of rights. "Consistent with the constitution of Virginia the legislature could not
create or continue a religious establishment which should have exclusive rights and preroga-
tives .... But the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be restrained by aiding
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Permoli v. First Municipality,147 a Roman Catholic Priest, Bernard
Permoli, was convicted of violating a New Orleans municipal statute
forbidding the exposure of any corpse in any Catholic church except
an obituary chapel. 4 8 Permoli argued that the Northwest Ordinances
of 1787,149 guaranteed to the "people and states in said territory" that
"[n]o person... shall ever be molested on account of his mode of wor-
ship or religious sentiments.' 150 From this he argued that "[tihe
United States have guarantied, to their inhabitants, religious liberty;
as absolutely as they have republican government to us al.,"151
Permoli further relied on the organic act admitting Louisiana to the
union,152 which provided that Louisiana's constitution must "contain
the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty."'1
The one argument Permoli had not made was that the statute
violated the First Amendment. Counsel for New Orleans nevertheless
answered that the city ordinance was not "repugnan[t] to the [federal]
with equal attention the votaries of every sect .... " Id. at 49. See Currie, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
901-05 (cited in note 63) (analyzing the Court's rationale in Terret).
In Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 Howard) 127 (1844), Girard left a substantial
devise for the establishment of a school for orphans in Philadelphia, but provided that "no
ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any
station or duty whatever in the said college." Id. at 133. Girard's heirs at law challenged the
devise on the grounds that it violated Pennsylvania public policy. The Court upheld the devise,
finding narrowly that it did not prohibit the teaching of Christianity entirely, only teaching by
clerics. Id. at 199. In the process the Court acknowledged that "the Christian religion is a part
of the common law of Pennsylvania." Id. at 198.
147. 44 U.S. (3 Howard) 589 (1845).
148. Id. at 590. The city alleged that the measure helped prevent the spread of yellow
fever. The ordinance affected only Municipality No. 1, a sector of New Orleans which was
predominantly Catholic. Counsel for the city suggested that Catholic congregations tradition-
ally held an open casket service at the church, while the Protestants usually held their services
at the cemetery. Id. at 600-01.
149. Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the river Ohio, 1 Stat.
50 (1789).
150. 44 U.S. (3 Howard) at 594 (quoting the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. at 51-52
n.(a)).
151. 44 U.S. (3 Howard) at 595. The analogy between the religion clause of the Northwest
Ordinance and the Guaranty Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 4, was an ironic
choice. During the ratification debates in North Carolina, James Iredell addressed the question
of "what is the meaning of that part, where it is said that the United States shall guaranty to
every state in the Union a republican form of government, and why a guaranty of religious
freedom was not included." 4 Elliot's Debates at 195 (cited in note 4). He explained that the
Guaranty Clause was "inserted to prevent any state from establishing any government but a
republican one.... Had Congress undertaken to guaranty religious freedom, or any particular
species of it, they would then have had a pretence to interfere in a subject they have nothing to
do with. Each state, so far as the clause in question does not interfere, must be left to the
operation of its own principles." Id.
152. Act to Enable the people of the Territory of Orleans to form a constitution and state
government, and for the admission of such state into the Union, on an equal footing with the
other states, and for other purposes, 1 Stat. 641 (1811).
153. Id. at 642, quoted in Permoli, 44 U.S. (3 Howard) at 595.
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constitution, because no provision thereof forbids the enactment of
law or ordinance, under state authority, in reference to religion. The
limitation of power in the first amendment of the Constitution is upon
Congress, and not the states. 154 Counsel then argued that, whatever
restrictions Congress might have imposed on territories, once admit-
ted to the union, Louisiana stood on equal terms with other states.155
The Court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction for failure
to state a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States.156
The matter, the Court found, did not arise under the Constitution:
'The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the
respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state
constitutions and laws: nor is there any inhibition imposed by the
Constitution of the United States in this respect on the states."1 7 The
Court turned to whether the Northwest Ordinances or statutes under
which the union admitted Louisiana were a federal guarantee of relig-
ious liberty. The Court agreed with the city that once Louisiana was
admitted to the union, religious liberties, as "political rights," were
secured, if at all, by the state constitution. 58 The question presented
was "exclusively of state cognisance."' 59  Missing from the Court's
discussion was any reference to Barron.160
In June 1865, at the close of the Civil War, the state of
Missouri amended its constitution to require an oath averring that
the person swearing the oath had never been in "armed hostility to
the United States," "manifested his adherence to cause of such ene-
mies," or "knowingly and willingly harbored, aided, or countenanced
any person so engaged."'6' Any person unable to take the oath should
154. Permoli, 44 U.S. (3 Howard) at 606.
155. Id. at 606-07.
156. Id. at 610. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (granting the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over state supreme court cases in which the exercise of authority by
a state is thought to be repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States).
157. Permoli, 44 U.S. (3 Howard) at 609.
158. Id. at 610.
159. Id.
160. Permoli was hardly a reaffirmation of Barron. In contrast to the current view, see
Amar, 101 Yale L. J. at 1202-03 & n.43 (cited in note 73) (citing Permoli as one of many cases
following Barron), Permoli really had nothing to do with Ban-on, and the Court treated the
cases that way. It seems unlikely that Ban-on was decided in anticipation of Permoli, or some
other First Amendment concern. But see Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge 23 (Duke
U., 1986) ("Barron avoided troubling questions.... It left southern states free to suppress
speech and press on the question of slavery').
161. Mo. Const. of 1865, Art. II, §§ 3, 7, reprinted in Benjamin Perley Poore, ed., 2 The
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United
States 1136, 1139-40 (Burt Franklin, 2d ed. 1876). See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
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not hold "any office of honor, trust or profit," including "acting as a
professor or teacher in any education institution" or "holding any real
estate or other property in trust for the use of any church, religious
society, or congregation. ' '162 In September. 1865, a Missouri jury con-
victed Reverend Cummings, a Roman Catholic priest, of failing to
take the oath while teaching "as a priest and minister of that religious
denomination."163
In Cummings v. Missouri,164 Reverend Cummings secured rep-
resentation before the Court from two of the most distinguished prac-
titioners of the day: David Dudley Field of New York165 and Senator
Reverdy Johnson of Maryland,166 who was, at the time of oral argu-
ment in March 1866, involved in the drafting of the Civil Rights Act 167
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Field argued first for Cummings
and pressed that the Missouri law violated the Ex Post Facto and Bill
of Attainder provisions.168  He referred frequently to Reverend
Cummings and his religious practices, but did not mention the First
Amendment.
The attorneys for Missouri, however, believed that Cumming's
attorney had made sufficient mention of "rights of conscience" to
merit formal response. These references were "well calculated to
excite interest.... [T]he American people are exceedingly sensitive
on the subject of religious freedom; and whenever the people are
told.., that the indefeasible right to worship God according to the
dictates of conscience is about to be invaded, the public mind at once
arouses itself to repel the invasion.'169 Citing the First Amendment
and Story's Commentaries, counsel argued that "Congress cannot
Wallace) 277, 279 (1867) (quoting in full the third section of Article II of the 1865 Missouri
Constitution).
162. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) at 280.
163. Id. at 282.
164. 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) 277 (1867). The case was argued March 15-20, 1866, and decided
January 14, 1867. See 18 L. Ed. 356 (1867) (discussing Cummings in an annotation). The
companion case, Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) 333 (1867), was argued March 14 and
December 15, 1866, and decided the same day as Cummings. 18 L. Ed. at 366.
165. David Field was the author of the "Field Code" of New York, the precursor of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and perhaps "the most commanding figure at the American
bar." Henry M. Field, The Life of David Dudley Field vii (Scribner's, 1898). He was also brother
to Justice Stephen J. Field, who authored the opinion for the Cummings majority.
166. According to Horace Flack, Johnson was "probably the best constitutional lawyer in
the 39th Congress." Horace Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 23 (Johns
Hopkins U., 1908). See Memoranda, 92 U.S. v, v-xvi (1876) (containing tributes to Reverdy
Johnson). Johnson also argued Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) at 333, the companion case to
Cummings.
167. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. See note 186 and accompanying text.
168. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) at 284-89. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
169. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) at 303-04 (argument of J.B. Henderson).
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establish a national faith.... But within the limits of the State
constitution.., the legislature has entire control of the subject. ''170
Reverdy Johnson, in reply, refused to let the point pass en-
tirely, but quickly retreated from an argument under the First
Amendment to one that sounded in substantive due process:
The Constitution of the United States, to be sure, so far as the article which
proclaims that there shall be no interference with religion is concerned, is not
obligatory upon the State of Missouri; but it announces a great principle of
American liberty... that as between a man and his conscience, as relates to
his obligations to God, it is not only tyrannical but unchristian to interfere....
The issue is whether the Church shall be free or not to exercise her natural
and inherent right of calling into, or rejecting from, her ministry whom she
pleases .... 171
The Court reversed the convictions as based on laws which
violated both the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses.'7 2 The
majority took no note of the applicability of either the First
Amendment or general principles of religious freedom. In dissent,
however, Justice Miller, joined by Chief Justice Chase and Justices
Swayne and Davis, addressed the "allusions... made in the course of
argument to the sanctity of the ministerial office, and to the inviola-
bility of religious freedom in this country."'1 3
[N]o attempt has been made to show that the Constitution of the United States
interposes any such protection between the State governments and their own
citizens. Nor can anything of this kind be shown. The Federal Constitution
contains but two provisions on this subject. One of these forbids Congress to
170. Id. at 304-05. Co-counsel had also argued:
Even the freedom of religious opinion, and the rights of conscience which we so highly
prize, are secured to us by the State constitutions, and find no protection in the
Constitution of the United States.
If any State were so unwise as to establish a State religion, and require every
priest and preacher to be licensed before he attempted to preach or teach, there is no
clause in the Federal Constitution that would authorize this court to pronounce the act
unconstitutional or void.
Id. at 294 (footnote omittted) (argument of G.P. Strong).
171. Id. at 313 (argument of Reverdy Johnson).
172. Id. at 327-28. The same day the Court struck down a federal loyalty oath on similar
grounds. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) at 333. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: Civil War and Reconstruction, 1865-1873, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 139-44 (1984)
(providing a history and analysis of the Court's decisions in Garland and Cummings). See also
Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88, in Paul A. Freund, ed., 6 The History of
the Supreme Court of the United States 151-160 (MacMillan, 1971) (discussing the political and
judicial debate surrounding the loyalty oath imposed by the 1865 Missouri Constitution).
173. The dissent was attached to the companion case, Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) at 382
(Miller, J., dissenting).
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make any law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The other is, that no religious test shall ever be required as a
qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.
No restraint is placed by that instrument on the action of the States; but
on the contrary, in the language of Story, "the whole power over the subject of
religion is left exclusively to the State governments, to be acted upon according
to their own sense ofjustice and the State constitutions."174
The dissent then asserted that "[i]f there ever was a case calling upon
this court to exercise all the power on this subject which properly
belongs to it, it was the case of the Rev. B. Permoli."175 Recounting the
facts in Permoli and calling the case "hard," the dissent contrasted
Permoli with the case at bar to demonstrate the much greater intru-
sion Cummings represented into state affairs. Permoli, the dissenters
said, involved "an ordinance of a mere local corporation," which
"forbid a priest, loyal to his government, from performing what he
believed to be the necessary rites of his church over the body of his
departed friend." By contrast, in this case "the fundamental law of
the people of [Missouri] ... declares that no priest of any church shall
exercise his ministerial functions, unless he will show, by his own
oath, that he has borne a true allegiance to his government.' 176 That
the Court would not interfere with the exercise of a religious rite in
Permoli, but would interfere with a mere oath of allegiance spoke for
itself.'"
The dissent's last point was largely rhetorical, of course, be-
cause the Court decided in favor of Cummings and against Permoli on
the basis of two different constitutional provisions. What is signifi-
cant is that in January of 1867, at a time when the Fourteenth
Amendment was pending before the states,178 at least four members of
the Court believed Permoli to be good law and continued to view the
First Amendment as applicable to Congress alone. And, as in
Permoli, no one in Cummings thought to cite Barron in support of the
proposition. The First Amendment stood on its own terms, apart from
the remainder of the Bill of Rights.
174. Id. at 397-98 (quoting Story, Commentaries at § 1878 (cited in note 120)).
175. Id. at 398.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, in Freund, ed., 6 The History of the Supreme
Court at 242-43 n.195 (cited in note 172).
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III. THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS: TEXT AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION
On its face the Fourteenth Amendment does not say anything
about the First Amendment. In its principal section it speaks instead
of "privileges or immunities," "equal protection," and "due process."
The Court has held for seventy years that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the First Amendment.'7 9
In this Section I examine the historical and textual bases for
claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First
Amendment and that Congress may enforce state compliance with the
First Amendment through Section 5. I propose to reexamine the text
of the Fourteenth Amendment, together with its legislative history
and the various theories of incorporation and enforcement in light of
my central thesis: that the First Amendment is fundamentally differ-
ent from the other amendments in the Bill of Rights and, accordingly,
we must treat it differently. Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 8 0
Section 5 states: 'The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article." These provisions,
read together, are "limitations of the power of the States and
enlargements of the power of Congress." 8'
The debates over the Fourteenth Amendment are extremely
frustrating because either. the Framers of that amendment were not
careful in their drafting, or they were deliberately vague. In any
event, the debates will support nearly any particular view of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For my purposes I do not have to resolve
here the great questions of the Fourteenth Amendment. What I
179. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946) (Establishment Clause); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
(Right of Petition Clause); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (Free Press Clause); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Free Speech Clause).
180. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
181. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
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intend to do is to demonstrate the consequences of various Fourteenth
Amendment theories on the First Amendment. All of this is
important, because the choice of theory-even the choice among
theories of incorporation-has important consequences for the
relationship between the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
A. The First Amendment and the Thirty-Ninth Congress
It is familiar history that the question of slavery dominated
constitutional, economic, and political institutions in the period be-
tween the Revolutionary War and the Civil War. Whether we exam-
ine the industrial revolution, changes in transportation, or trade
practices, some question regarding slavery lurks near. The question
so dominated political and economic discourse that it soon dominated
other kinds of discourse as well. The Southern states, feeling threat-
ened and fearing insurrection, censored abolitionist speech, books,
newspapers, and pamphlets.18 2 Congress, not immune to the persis-
tence and vociferousness of abolitionists, suppressed First
Amendment rights by suspending its rules regarding the receipt of
petitions.183
The suspension of rights of free speech and press, and to a
lesser degree, suspension of religious liberty in the South,18 were
among the bill of particulars levied in Congress against the insurgent
states. According to Representative James Wilson, slavery
persecuted religionists [and] denied the privileges of free discussion; ... [the]
agitations [of slavery] dominated over everything... overshadowed the mate-
rial interests of the country, directed its legislation, overawed its executive
182. Russel B. Nye, Fettered Freedom: Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy, 1830-
1860 at 155-58, 171 (Mich. State U., 1963); Curtis, No State Shall Abridge at 52 (cited in note
160).
183. Nye, Fettered Freedom at 45-46 (cited in note 182); Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A
Short History of the Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances, 96 Yale L. J. 142,
158-65 (1986).
184. See II Report of the Committees of the House of Representatives, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
39, 45-46, 53 (1866); Cong Rec., 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wilson);
Curtis, No State Shall Abridge at 138-39 (cited in note 160); Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-
Thought in the Old South 300-34 (Harper & Row, rev. ed. 1964); Wiecek, Sources of Antislavery
Constitutionalism at 177, 181-83 (cited in note 59); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Establishment Clause: The Incorporation of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 Ariz. St. L. Rev.
(forthcoming, Winter 1995); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause:
Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1106, 1131-36
(1994). See also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wallace) 36, 123 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) ('The mischief to be remedied was not merely slavery and its
incidents... but... intolerance of free speech and free discussion which often rendered life and
property insecure..."); Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-
1877 at 88-97 (Harper & Roe, 1988).
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agents, controlled its courts, corrupted its religion, debased its morals, vitiated
its literature, beclouded and benumbed everything upon which a people must
rely for greatness, prosperity, happiness, and the promotion of the general wel-
fare. 1
8 5
In January 1866 the Senate began consideration of what would be-
come the Civil Rights Act of 1866.186 Before the House even began its
own consideration of the bill, it constituted a Joint Committee on
Reconstruction to begin work on an amendment to the Constitution.187
Within two weeks of the passage of the Civil Rights Act in April 1866,
Congress had drafted what would become the Fourteenth
Amendment. The amendment cleared Congress by June 1866 and
was ratified in July 1868.188
References to the Bill of Rights lace the debates over the Civil
Rights Bill and the proposed amendment to the Constitution. While
it is not necessary for my purposes to recount all references to the Bill
of Rights, I wish to review those having a bearing on the First
Amendment.
1. The First Amendment and the Debate Over John Bingham's
Proposed Amendment, February 1866
In late February 1866, John Bingham, Republican representa-
tive from Ohio and a member of the Joint Committee, offered an
amendment to the Constitution:
ARTICLE__. The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.8 9
Representative Bingham observed that he had drawn the language of
the proposed amendment from the Privileges and Immunities Clause
185. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1201, 1202 (1864). See also id. at 138 (statement of
Rep. Ashley) (stating that slavery has "silenced every free pulpit within its control" and
suppresssed speech and press).
186. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 ("An Act to protect all Persons in the United
States in their Civil Rights and furnish The Means of their Vindication').
187. Chronologies may be found in Curtis, No State Shall Abridge at 57-91 (cited in note
160); Flack, Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment at 55-139 (cited in note 166); Joseph B.
James, The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment (Illinois U., 1956); Charles Fairman, Does
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 8, 19-68 (1949).
188. 15 Stat. 708, 708-11 (1868).
189. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
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(or Comity Clause)190 and the Fifth Amendment.191 According to
Bingham, there was a "want" for "an express grant of power in the
Constitution to enable the whole people of every State, by
congressional enactment, to enforce obedience to these
requirements. '192 The proposed amendment would "not impose upon
any State... or any citizen.., any obligation which is not now
enjoined upon them by the very letter of the Constitution." The
amendment merely secured the power to enforce "this immortal bill of
rights," which had to that point "rested for its execution and
enforcement... upon the fidelity of the States."193
Representative Bingham evidently believed the Bill of Rights
was already binding upon the states, probably through the Comity
Clause. 94  What the Constitution lacked, however, was a means to
enforce the Comity Clause against the states. 195 Bingham and others
conceded that their view of the application of the Bill of Rights to the
states was in conflict with what the courts had actually held. The
190. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ('The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States).
191. Id. Amend. V ("No person... shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law...").
192. Cong. Globe at 1034 (cited in note 189). As Rep. Rogers, a member of the Joint
Committee and critic of Bingham's proposal, explained, the Necessary and Proper Clause only
gave Congress power to facilitate the powers of the government:
The courts have decided that guarantees, privileges, and immunities are not powers,
and when the Constitution authorized Congress to make all laws necessary and proper
to carry into execution the powers vested in the Government, it meant powers
strictly... That powers do not mean guarantees and privileges we all agree; and
because of that this amendment in part is deemed necessary.
Id. at app.135.
193. Id. at 1034. Fairman suggests that when Rep. Bingham referred to "this immortal bill
of rights" he meant the Constitution generally, rather than the Bill of Rights. Fairman,
Reconstruction and Reunion, in Freund, ed., 6 The History of the Supreme Court at 26 (cited in
note 172). Jacobus ten Broek states that Bingham was not referring to the Bill of Rights, but
probably to the Comity Clause, the Due Process Clause, and some kind of equal protection
notion. Jacobus ten Broek, Equal Under Law 214 (Collier, 1965).
194. Curtis, No State Shall Abridge at 59-62 (cited in note 160). See Richard L. Aynes, On
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 Yale L. J. 57, 79 (1993). See
also Cong. Globe at 1202 (cited in note 185) (statement of Rep. Wilson) ("Freedom of religious
opinion, freedom of speech and press ... belong to every American citizen.... With these
rights no state may interfere").
195. Cong. Globe at 1054 (cited in note 194) (statement of Rep. Higby) (asserting that the
proposed amendment "will only have the effect to give vitality and life to portions of the
Constitution that probably were intended from the beginning to have life and vitality, but which
have received such a construction that they have been entirely ignored .... When we read this
proposed amendment we will think it already embraced in the Constitution, but so scattered
through different portions of it that it has no life or energy). See also id. at 1063 (statement of
Rep. Kelley) ("[Alll the power this amendment will give is already in the Constitution"); id. at
1088 (statement of Rep. Woodbridge) (stating that the amendment would "enable
Congress... to give a citizen of the United States... those privileges and immunities which
are guarantied to him under the Constitution of the United States').
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problem was, of course, Barron, which Bingham and others cited by
name. 196 After Barron, "the people [we]re without remedy.' 197
Throughout the discussion, Representative Bingham and
others treated the First Amendment as an expression of personal
rights and referred to it as an undifferentiated part of the broader Bill
of Rights. Nevada Senator James Nye, for example, referred to "'life,'
'liberty,' 'property,' 'freedom of speech,' 'freedom of the press,' 'freedom
in the exercise of religion,' [and] 'security of person,"' as "natural and
personal rights of the citizen," established through "fundamental law"
which no state "ha[d] the power to subvert or impair."'198 And
Republican Representative Roswell Hart argued that a republican
government is "a government whose 'citizens shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of other citizens'; [and] where 'no law shall
be made prohibiting the free exercise of religion."' Where the states
do not afford those privileges, "it is the duty of the United States to
guaranty that they have it speedily."'199
Opponents of Bingham's proposal, like the Republicans in the
Sedition Act debates, recognized that the First Amendment has both a
federalism and a separation of powers component, and they ques-
tioned Congress's power to affect the scope of the First Amendment
through the Bingham proposal. Indiana Democrat Michael Kerr
stated that the "privileges and immunities referred to as attainable in
the States are required to be attained, if at all, according to the laws
or constitutions of the States, and never in defiance of them."200
Representative Kerr assailed the idea that "the first eleven
amendments to the Constitution are grants of power to Congress; that
they contain guarantees which it is the right and duty of Congress to
196. See, for example, id. at 1089-90 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (Bingham also quoted
from Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 469, 551 (1833)); id. at app.135 (statement
of Rep. Rogers); id. at 1270 (statement of Rep. Kerr).
197. Id. at 1090 (statement of Rep. Bingham). See also id. at 1292 ("ITlhe bill of rights, as
has been solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States, does not limit the powers
of States').
198. Id. at 1072. See also id. at 1075 (arguing that the Constitution forbids states from
interfering with "natural or personal rights enumerated or implied in the Constitution"). These
rights, Sen. Nye recognized, "Congress has no power to invade," but he thought Congress did
have "power to make all laws 'necessary and proper' to give them effective operation and to
restrain the respective States from infracting them." Id. at 1072.
199. Id. at 1629. Rep. Hart also quoted portions of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments.
200. Id. at 1270.
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secure and enforce in the States."201 Referring to the Bill of Rights
and quoting from Barron, Kerr added:
Hitherto those amendments have been supposed.., to contain only limitations
on the power of Congress.... They were not intended to be, and they are not,
limitations on the powers of the States. They are bulwarks of freedom, erected
by the people between the States and the Federal Government ....
I am telling this House, that they have no right to find a grant of power in
what was intended as a limitation upon power.... [T]hese are limitations
upon the power of Congress and not upon the powers of the States. They are
not guarantees at all, except to protect the States against the usurpations of
Congress and the General Government. They simply say that Congress shall
not invade the rights of the States of this Union to do things that are forbidden
to be done by the first eleven amendments of the Constitution.
20 2
Representative Kerr's view, unlike the idiosyncratic views of
Representative Bingham, was consonant with the views of the
Founders and, more importantly, the Supreme Court. Moreover, his
central point, that it was a non sequitur for Congress to attempt to
enforce limitations on its own powers, was a point that many would
repeat in the debates over enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Republican Robert Hale of New York made a similar point
regarding the power of Congress and noted the amendment shifted
responsibility for enforcement from federal courts to Congress:
Now, what are these amendments to the Constitution, numbered from one to
ten[?]... They do not contain, from beginning to end, a grant of power any-
where. On the contrary, they are all restrictions of power. They constitute the
bill of rights, a bill of rights for the protection of the citizen, and defining and
limiting the power of Federal and State legislation. They are not matters upon
which legislation can be based. They begin with the proposition that 'Congress
shall make no law,'.., and... [t]hroughout they provide safeguards to be en-
forced by the courts, and not to be exercised by the Legislature.
20 3
201. Id.
202. Id. Five years later, during debates over enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Rep. Kerr repeated that "the first eleven amendments ... are limitations on the powers of
Congress as against the States." He also added that they were "fundamental guarantees to the
people." Cong. Globe at app.46 (cited in note 1). There is no inconsistency here. Personal
guarantees to people can be secured both by limiting the powers of a government we expect
might be tempted to encroach on them, or by committing the protection of such guarantees to a
government that we expect would be benevolent.
203. Cong. Globe at 1064 (cited in note 1). Rep. Hale's misstatement, that the Bill of Rights
limited "Federal and State legislation," was seized by Rep. Bingham, who cited Barron as
evidence that the courts were not an adequate restraint to state legislation. Cong. Globe at
1089-90 (cited in note 189).
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Representative Hale even went so far as to suggest, perhaps
facetiously, that the First Amendment phrase "Congress shall make
no law" might itself be "a sufficient prohibition" against further
legislation.204
Representative Hale's reference to "Congress shall make no
law" was curious because it refers to the text of the First Amendment
but is not an accurate paraphrase of the remaining amendments. He
was, of course, correct that the First Amendment prohibits Congress
from enacting certain kinds of laws. However, Amendments Two
through Eight do not, either by text or by virtue of Barron, prohibit
Congress from passing legislation respecting their subject matter, and
in fact, the Third Amendment expressly anticipates that Congress
would do so. 20 5 Hale's point about congressional enforcement was well
taken with respect to the First Amendment, but not to the others.
For Democrat A.J. Rogers of New Jersey, a member of the
Joint Committee and vocal opponent of the amendment, the proposal
was "the embodiment of centralization and the disfranchisement of
the States."26 Citing Corfield v. Coryell,2 7 he complained that the
term "privileges and immunities" had been construed so broadly that
"it is easy to perceive why our fathers refused to authorize Congress
to legislate on this subject by granting no power to it" and why "[the
Due Process Clause] as well as the other guarantees of the
Constitution, have been repeatedly decided by the Supreme
Court... to apply only to cases affecting the Federal Government."208
"[A]ny power to override a State and settle.., the rights, privileges,
and immunities of citizens in the several States... was left entirely
for the courts. '20 9 Even Representative Bingham could not take issue
with the latter point. Although Bingham had claimed that giving
Congress "the power to enforce the bill of rights" took "from the States
204. Id. at 1064.
205. U.S. Const., Amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law'.
See note 73.
206. Cong. Globe at app.133 (cited in note 189).
207. 6 F. Cases 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
208. Cong. Globe at app.135 (cited in note 189).
209. Id. at app.133. Rep. Rogers did not deny Rep. Bingham's analysis that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause included the Bill of Rights, or that all that was missing from the
Constitution was an enforcement provision. Alfred Avins has argued that many members of
Congress understood that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would permit congressional
enforcement of the Comity Clause, but because of Barron many would have assumed that the
Comity Clause did not include the Bill of Rights. Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 Harv. J. Leg. 1, 13-15 (1968).
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no rights that belong to the States,210 he later admitted that "[a]
grant of power, according to all construction, is a very different thing
from a bill of rights. 211
Ultimately, several concerns over the scope of the powers
granted Congress led the House to postpone consideration of the
proposal while it turned to the Civil Rights Act.212 First, it was un-
clear to a number of members of Congress whether the proposed
amendment granted Congress plenary power over state laws, or only
power over those state laws that did not apply equally to blacks and
whites.2 3 Second, there was still the question of enforcement. Some
members became convinced that Congress must have the power to
enforce whatever substantive guarantees the amendment contained,
while others were persuaded that enforcement should be left to the
judiciary. Shortly before the House postponed the resolution,
Representative Hotchkiss stated that "[c]onstitutions should have
their provisions so plain that it will be unnecessary for courts to give
construction to them; they should be so plain that the common mind
can understand them."2 4 He suggested that in order to avoid "the
caprice of Congress" the amendment should simply provide that "no
State shall discriminate against any class of its citizens,"21 5 thus mak-
ing clear that an amendment should require equal enforcement of
existing state guarantees, and that the federal judiciary should be
responsible for its enforcement.216
2. The First Amendment and the Debates Over the Proposed
Fourteenth Amendment, May-June 1866
By early April 1866 Congress had enacted the Civil Rights Act
over the veto of President Andrew Johnson. But with nagging ques-
tions about Congress's authority to pass the Act, the Joint Committee
210. Cong. Globe at 1088, 2090 (cited in note 189). See also id. at 1292 (I have advocated
here an amendment which would arm Congress with the power to compel obedience to the oath,
and punish all violations by State officers of the [Civil Rights Act]').
211. Id. at 1093. See also id. ("[I1s there any one prepared to say that the bill of rights
confers express legislative power on Congress[?]').
212. See Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment-The
Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 Const. Comm. 123, 125-47 (1986) (discussing the 1866
debates).
213. See, for example, Cong. Globe at 1066-67, 1094-95 (cited in note 189).
214. Id. at 1095.
215. Id.
216. William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial
Doctrine 145 (Harvard U., 1988). See also Bernard Schwartz, From Confederation to Nation:
The American Constitution, 1835-1877 at 196 (Johns Hopkins U., 1973) (discussing enforcement
of the Bingham proposal).
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again set to drafting an amendment to submit to the states.217 In
early May, Thaddeus Stevens introduced the redrafted proposal in the
House, in a form very similar to the amendment ultimately ratified.
Admitting that the "proposition is not all that the committee desired,"
Stevens explained that the first section contained privileges or immu-
nities, due process, and equal protection clauses, "all asserted, in
some form or other, in our DECLARATION or organic law. '218 The prob-
lem, he noted, was that "the Constitution limits only the action of
Congress, and is not a limitation on the States. This amendment
supplies that defect."219 Had he stopped there, the members might
have heard the echoes of Representative Bingham's February
speeches. But Stevens then added that the proposed amendment only
"allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far
that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon
all.1220 As Stevens stated it, the proposed amendment incorporated
familiar restrictions, though he did not make reference to the
substantive restrictions of the Bill of Rights, or for that matter, to any
substantive body of law. Rather, he suggested that the real import of
the new provision was that it required that the states enact and
administer their laws equally.221
Two weeks after Representative Stevens introduced the
revised proposal in the House, Jacob Howard of Michigan introduced
the same proposal in the Senate. His reflections on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause are some of the most frequently cited evidence for
incorporation and stand in contrast to Stevens's remarks in the
House. Senator Howard thought the Privileges or Immunities Clause
217. See, for example, Cong. Globe at 2465 (cited in note 189) (statement of Rep. Thayer)
(arguing that the amendment would constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act); id. at 2467
(statement of Rep. Boyer) (noting that the amendment "embodies the principles" of the Civil
Rights Act).
218. Id. at 2459.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. As Rep. Stevens explained:
Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the black man precisely in
the same way and to the same degree. Whatever law protects the white man shall af-
ford 'equal' protection to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one
shall be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify in courts shall al-
low the man of color to do the same. These are great advantages over their present
codes.
Id. See also id. at 2511 (statement of Rep. Eliot) (supporting the proposed amendment and
arguing that if Congress did not have the power to prohibit discriminatory state legislation,
such power should be conferred). But see id. at 2530 (statement of Rep. Randall) (arguing that
the power to create the equality of citizens should be left to the states).
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in proposed Section 1 "a general prohibition upon all the States" and
"very important. 222 Referring to the Comity Clause in Article IV, he
thought "[lt would be a curious question to solve what are the
privileges and immunities of citizens of each of the States in the
several States."223  He was "certain the clause was inserted in the
Constitution for some good purpose. It has in view some results
beneficial to the citizens of the several States, or it would not be found
there. '224 After quoting from Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield,
he stated:
To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-for they are not
and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature-to these
should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight
amendments of the Constitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the
press; the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances, a right appertaining to each and all
the people; the right to keep and to bear arms; the right to be exempted from
the quartering of soldiers in a house without the consent of the owner; the
right to be exempt from unreasonable searches and seizures, and from any
search or seizure except by virtue of a warrant issued upon a formal oath or af-
fidavit; the right of an accused person to be informed of the nature of the accu-
sation against him, and his right to be tried by an impartial jury of the vici-
nage; and also the right to be secure against excessive bail and against cruel
and unusual punishments.2
25
Senator Howard then observed that these privileges "do not operate in
the slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition upon State legisla-
tion. States are not affected by them, and it has been repeatedly held
that the restriction contained in the Constitution against the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation is not a
restriction upon State legislation, but applies only to the legislation of
Congress."226 Thus, "the States are not restrained from violating the
principles embraced in them except by their own local constitutions,
which may be altered from year to year.''227 Howard explained that
the new amendment would "restrain the power of the States and
compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guaran-
tees.122s The guarantees originally, as written, were only self-
executing because "they are not powers granted to Congress," but
222. Id. at 2765.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. This statement was an obvious reference to Barron. See notes 61-63 and
accompanying text.
227. Id. at 2766.
228. Id.
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Section 5, as an "affirmative delegation of power to Congress to carry
out all the principles of all these guarantees,"229 would remedy that.
Senator Howard's statement is the clearest explanation in the
Thirty-ninth Congress as to how the Amendment might incorporate
the Bill of Rights and empower Congress to enforce it. Regrettably, it
elicited no response; neither comments nor debate. Either Howard
had spoken so forcefully that there was no further discussion on this
point, or the point simply did not sink in. The evidence in the
legislative history supports the latter.2° A week after Howard's
speech, Democratic Senator Thomas Hendricks of Indiana "ask[ed]
what it means when we speak of 'abridging' the rights and
immunities of citizenship. It is a little difficult to say, and I have not
heard any Senator accurately define, what are the rights and
immunities of citizenship; and I do not know that any statesman has
very accurately defined them."231 The same day Reverdy Johnson, the
only Democratic Senator on the Joint Committee, spoke in favor of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in the proposed
amendment, but thought it "quite objectionable" to include the
Privileges or Immunities Clause "simply because I do not understand
what will be the effect of that. 2 32  He moved that the clause be
stricken. The Senate rejected the motion but the point was well
made. Johnson, one of the leading practitioners before the Supreme
Court, had only two months before argued Cummings v. Missouri and
229. Id. See also id. ("I look upon the first section, taken in connection with the fifth, as
very important. It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them from passing
laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the
United States").
230. But see Aynes, 103 Yale L. J. at 103 (cited in note 194) (suggesting that Sen. Howard's
proposition was well accepted and that the caucus of Union Republican Senators had agreed to
limit debate).
Sen. Howard's statement is not without its problems. Aside from his uncertainty as to what
the "privileges and immunities" in Article IV referred to, what is striking about Howard's
laundry list of rights is that he omits any reference to the religion clauses, although he men-
tions the remaining rights in the First Amendment. It would be tempting to infer that this was
deliberate on Howard's part, but the inference would probably demand too much; Howard's
speech simply does not reach that level of precision. Moreover, besides the religion clauses, he
failed to mention the Grand Jury, Double Jeopardy, Due Process, and Takings Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment and the Jury provision of the Seventh Amendment. We might well make
more of the clauses Howard omitted when we recall that application of the Grand Jury Clause,
U.S. Const., Amend. V, to the states would have been a sensitive matter, requiring substantial
reworking of state criminal procedures. See Fairman, 2 Stan. L. Rev. at 82-83 (cited in note
187). But there would be no reason for Howard to have omitted the Double Jeopardy Clause
and certainly not the Takings Clause, especially after having just taken pains to refer to Barron.
231. Cong. Globe at 3039 (cited in note 189).
232. Id. at 3041.
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had made a substantive due process argument based on the free
exercise of religion, an argument met with citation of the First
Amendment and Permoli.133 If Reverdy Johnson and Thomas
Hendricks did not understand the effect of the Clause, and Jacob
Howard was unsure of what it included, it was likely that many oth-
ers also did not understand the Clause.
There was no other substantive reference to the First
Amendment or its enforcement in the debates. The House passed the
amendment on May 10,2 4 as did the Senate on June 8.235 The House
gave final approval to the Senate's changes on June 13, 1866.26 The
states ratified it July 9, 1868.
What emerges from the debates is not a coalescing of views
and intentions, but an uncertain confederation of votes. While many
members of Congress cited various provisions of the Constitution,
cases, Elliot's Debates, and commentators such as Story and Kent,
the members were not clear as to what the Constitution meant, and
they agreed on little. The views of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment are astonishingly imprecise.237 As legal draftsmen, the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were much less accomplished
than the Founders; they were surprisingly nonplussed by the mechan-
ics of the amendment they were drafting.23 8 At least some members of
Congress believed Section 1 incorporated the Bill of Rights, but few
were concerned with their draftsmanship, even when other members
complained that the language did not convey the purpose of the
amendment as they understood it.239 For a Congress that parted with
the Supreme Court over the construction of the Constitution in cases
such as Barron and Dred Scott, the Framers were remarkably
sanguine about the prospects that the Court would get it right, a
233. See notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
234. Cong. Globe at 2545 (cited in note 189).
235. Id. at 3042.
236. Id. at 3149.
237. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 143-45 (cited in note 216); Fairman, 2 Stan. L.
Rev. at 9 (cited in note 187); Timothy S. Bishop, Comment, The Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 142, 174-76 (1984).
238. Judith Baer argues that the Radical Republicans "were just not legalistic thinkers"
and that they assumed any interpretive difficulties could be corrected legislatively. Judith A.
Baer, Equality Under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth Amendment 101-02 (Cornell
U., 1983). See also Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 143 (cited in note 216).
239. See Cong. Globe at 1082 (cited in note 189) (statement of Sen. Stewart) ("It seems to
me that the grammatical, legal, and necessary construction of this proposed amendment can
hardly have been intended by its framers"); id. at 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss) (asserting
that constitutions "should be so plain that the common mind can understand them" and
recommending that Rep. Bingham's proposal be tabled until Congress can "agree upon an
amendment that shall secure beyond question what the gentleman desires to secure).
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problem borne out almost immediately in the Court's implausible
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in The Slaughter-
House Cases.20
While the opponents of the proposed amendment, or at least
more cautious reformers, held views of the First Amendment much
closer to the Founders and to the Supreme Court, Representative
Bingham and his supporters failed to differentiate the First
Amendment from the remaining guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
Rather than recognizing the First Amendment as a disability on the
power of Congress, they treated it as did the Federalists in 1798, as a
personal right. Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment's
supporters held such idiosyncratic views of the Constitution241 that it
is difficult to take their mechanics for incorporation too seriously;
they failed to address either the Constitution or the Court's decisions
on their own terms. Their views were such a striking contrast to the
views of the Court they so criticized,242 it is no wonder the Court and
Congress failed to understand each other.
B. The First and Fourteenth Amendments in the Wake of Ratification
1. The First and Fourteenth Amendments in Congress: The
Enforcement Debates
Whatever meaning members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
thought the Fourteenth Amendment possessed in 1866 was quickly
lost in the post-ratification debates over the Fifteenth Amendment
and civil rights enforcement laws. The members of the Forty-second
Congress, many of whom had been members of the Thirty-ninth, could
not agree in 1871 any more than they could in 1866.243 In contrast to
the earlier debates, which manifested more concern for the substance
of the disabilities visited on the states in Section 1, the later debates
240. 83 U.S. (16 Wallace) 36 (1873). See notes 284-86 and accompanying text. For a more
complete discussion of the background and circumstances surrounding these three decisions, see
Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 396-411 (Foundation, 12th ed. 1991) (The Bill of Rights and
the Post-Civil War Amendments: Fundamental Procedural Rights and the "Incorporation"
Dispute).
241. Curtis, No State Shall Abridge at 91 (cited in note 160); Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill
of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 45, 55-56, 88-92 (1980).
242. But see Aynes, 103 Yale L. J. at 83-94 (cited in note 194) (arguing that Rep. Bingham's
views were not outside the mainstream of the period's legal thought).
243. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 148 (cited in note 216).
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naturally showed greater attention to the scope of Congress's power
under Section 5. The 1871 debates again featured John Bingham
who, together with Samuel Shellabarger, advocated broad
interpretation of Sections 1 and 5. They were well opposed.
Once again many members referred to the First Amendment.
But both sides in 1871 focused more on the Constitution's text and
structure, and their arguments reflect far greater sophistication than
the ratification debates. Those who favored broad interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment again treated the First Amendment as a
personal privilege or immunity, and thus of the same genre as
Amendments Two through Eight. Opponents of the civil rights en-
forcement acts contended that the acts were beyond Congress's
powers and used the First Amendment as proof of the limitations.
The opposition relied on both the federalism and the separation of
powers aspects of the First Amendment.
a. The First Amendment as a congressionally enforceable
personal privilege
Perhaps the most cited post-ratification discussion of the Bill
of Rights is John Bingham's speech in March 1871. Bingham re-
minded the House that he "had the honor to frame the [Fourteenth
A]mendment," both the amendment "as reported in February 1866,
and the first section, as it now stands."2A4 He stated that he changed
the form of the February 1866 proposal after re-reading Barron and
Lessee of Livingston v. Moore .245 Confessing that Barron was
"properly decided," Bingham then quoted from Justice Marshall's
opinion: "Had the framers of [the Bill of Rights] intended them to be
limitations on the powers of the State governments they would have
imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and have expressed
that intention."246 According to Bingham, "[aicting upon [Barron's]
suggestion," he "imitate[d] the framers of the original Constitution."
Just as they provided in Article I, Section 10 that "no State
shall..." he began Section 1 of the amendment with the same
language.247
Representative Bingham then turned to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. He stated flatly, "the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens
244. Cong. Globe at app.83 (cited in note 1).
245. 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 469 (1833).
246. Cong. Globe at app.84 (cited in note 1) (quoting Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) at 250).
247. Id.
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of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the
Constitution of the United States."2 48 He then proceeded to quote
verbatim the first eight amendments.249 Noting that states had
abridged freedom of press, speech, and rights of conscience, Bingham
concluded that because of Section 5 Congress was "competent... to
declare that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble together and petition for redress of
grievances ."250 Bingham's argument is simple enough. The states
were prohibited from denying the first eight amendments to their
citizens, and Congress had the power to enforce the prohibitions.
Samuel Shellabarger carried Bingham's argument even further
on the question of enforcement. He asserted that "the United States
always has assumed to enforce, as against the States ... every one of
the provisions of the Constitution."251 He then distinguished between
federal enforcement of the Article I, Section 10 disabilities, which "do
not relate directly to the rights of persons," and which only the courts
enforced, and the "rights or the liabilities of persons.., as between
such persons and the States" found in Article IV, Section 2.22 As to
these latter "rights or liabilities," Shellabarger claimed that "Congress
has by legislation affirmatively interfered to protect or to subject such
persons. '253 He then equated the Fugitive Slave Clause2---a provision
248. Id. See also id. at app.31O (statement of Rep. Maynard).
249. Id. at app.84.
250. Id. at app.85. Rep. Bingham offered no explanation for omitting reference to the
religion clauses.
Three years later Sen. Norwood of Georgia made a similar, vigorous defense of incorpo-
ration. Norwood, unlike Bingham before him, had the benefit of the Court's intervening
decision in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wallace) at 36. Norwood, quoting from
Permoli, observed that prior to the Fourteenth Amendment "any State might have established a
particular religion, or restricted freedom of speech and of the press, or the right to bear
arms ... and so on." Cong. Rec., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. app.242 (1874). In his view, upon
ratification, "every State was that moment disabled from making or enforcing any law which
would deprive any citizen of a State of the benefits enjoyed by citizens of the United States
under the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution." Id. See id. at app.244 (claiming
that the Fourteenth Amendment "prevent[s] the states themselves from depriving their citizens
of [the guarantees of the Bill of Rights]"). See also id. at 384-85 (statement of Rep. Mills); id. at
420 (statement of Rep. Herndon); id. at 342-43 (statement of Rep. Beck). Although Sen.
Norwood's methodology was coherent, hi.9 elaborate discussion is suspect, because Norwood's
real concern was not to defend incorporation, but to concede incorporation and deny any other
effect to Section 1, thereby confiming its incursion on states' rights. Id. at app.242-44. See also
Curtis, No State Shall Abridge at 167-68 (cited in note 160).
251. Cong. Globe at app.69 (cited in note 1). He had just quoted Jones v. Van Zandt, 46
U.S. (5 Howard) 215, 230 (1847).
252. Cong. Globe at app.69 (cited in note 1).
253. Id. at 69-70.
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"in restraint of the power of the States"--with the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 255 In the Fugitive
Slave Clause, "[n]o express power is given to Congress to return or
make laws for the return of the fugitive. There is no express grant of
power whatever found in the clause; merely a negation upon the
power of the States," yet it had been well "affirmed that upon that
mere negation upon the power of the States it was the right of
Congress to enforce its provisions by affirmative law."256 Shellabarger
must have had in mind Prigg v. Pennsylvania,257 in which the Court
held that the Fugitive Slave Clause implied a power in Congress to
settle the details of the return of slaves.
Shellabarger had crafted his point well on the Fugitive Slave
Clause, but he pushed his argument too far. Bingham had boasted
that in Section 1 he had imitated the form of the disabilities of Section
10 ("no state shall"), but that was the section which Shellabarger
noted was subject to judicial enforcement only. If Shellaburger was
correct about the difference between Article I, Section 10 and Article
IV, by Bingham's admission, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
was enforceable only by the judiciary.
b. The First Amendment as a court-enforced disability
Other members of Congress, including many who had been
present in 1866 and supported the Amendment, criticized Bingham's
and Shellabarger's claim that Section 1 guaranteed new rights.2 8
254. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No persons held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or regulation
therein be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the
party to whom such service or labor may be due").
255. Cong. Globe at app.70 (cited in note 1).
256. Id. See also Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 727 (1869) (statements of Rep. Bingham
and Rep. Jenckes) (discussing the difference between enforcing negative and affirmative
provisions).
257. 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 539 (1842).
258. For example, fellow Ohio Rep. James Garfield took issue with Bingham over whether
Section 1 created new rights, or simply guaranteed to all citizens equal rights. He argued that
Thaddeus Stevens's May 1866 speech emphasizing the need for equality in the application of the
laws was "Itihe interpretation... followed by almost every Republican who spoke on this
measure," and he agreed with New York Rep. Hotchkiss's assessment that Bingham's original
proposal was too "radical a change in the Constitution" and would never have passed. Cong.
Globe at app.151 (cited in note 1). John Farnsworth had a similar exchange with Bingham, in
which Farnsworth quoted extensively from the 1866 debates, and disputed that Bingham's
February 1866 proposal had survived in the Fourteenth Amendment. Like Garfield,
Farnsworth quoted Rep. Stevens's May 1866 speech to show that the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to correct "the partial, discriminating, and unjust legislation" of states. Id. at
app.115-16.
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More importantly, the members repeatedly challenged Bingham's and
Shellabarger's expansive views of Congress's section 5 powers. First,
they argued that Section 5 was nothing more than a necessary and
proper clause for the Fourteenth Amendment, and its real purpose
was to secure Sections 2 and 3 of the Amendment, which contem-
plated congressional action. According to Illinois Republican John
Farnsworth, "[Section 11 of the amendment requires no
legislation; ... the courts can execute it. ' '259 By contrast, the "other
provisions in that amendment... require legislation by Congress. '2 60
The point was technically correct, although perhaps a little simplistic.
Section 2 provides that a state's representation in Congress would be
reduced in proportion the state's abridgement of the right to vote;
Section 3 disqualifies certain persons from holding certain public
offices, but provides that Congress could remove the disability.261
These provisions in and of themselves are probably sufficient to imply
the power in Congress to enforce them. Accordingly, Section 5 would
have been superfluous.
Second, they objected that even if Section 5 were a broader
grant of power than the Necessary and Proper Clause, no power in
Congress could be derived from a mere prohibition on the states. As
Representative Golladay stated,
by a negative provision States are prohibited from making and enforcing laws
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States. It is... well understood, that negative provisions confer no power to
Sen. Blair of Missouri quoted the same Stevens speech to show that Bingham's statements
in 1866 were not authoritative. Id. at app.231. Rep. Willard and Sen. Bayard emphasized that
the Fourteenth Amendment, in Bayard's words, "enlarged the class, but ... did not enlarge the
rights of those included in it." Id. at app.242 (statement of Sen. Bayard). See id. at app.189
(statement of Rep. Willard) (claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment "does not abrogate, nor
modify, nor in any way change the previous Constitution. It only authorizes Congress to extend
its previous power of legislation... to secure to this new class of citizens the same protection').
259. Cong. Globe at app.ii7 (cited in note 1). See id. at 578 (statement of Sen. Trumbull)
("[In regard to all the rights secured by the fourteenth amendment... the courts are
established to vindicate them, and they can be vindicated in no other way").
260. Id. at app.117. See id. at app.231 (statement of Sen. Blair) ("[T]he enforcement section
does not apply to the first section"); id. at app.314 (statement of Sen. Burchard) (arguing that
Section 5 is no broader than the Necessary and Proper Clause); id. at app.259 (statement of
Rep. Holman) (claiming that Section 5 has "reference only to the second and third
sections ... both of which clearly require the action of Congress; but the first confers on
Congress no powers of legislation'). See also id. at app.87 (statement of Rep. Storm) (arguing
that Section 5 "enacted nothing new"; "the power to enforce by appropriate legislation all the
provisions of the Constitution" was already found in the Necessary and Proper Clause).
261. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, §§ 2, 3.
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enact positive laws. There is simply a denial of power to States, and not a con-
ferring of power on Congress to pass laws.
262
Senator Stockton ridiculed the notion that "because no State can,
Congress may; or, in other words, the denial of power to a State con-
fers it on Congress."263 While this argument would answer Bingham's
claim that he had imitated Article I, Section 10, it would not answer
completely Samuel Shellabarger's point that Congress had assumed
the power to enforce restrictions on state power in Article IV even
though no such power was expressly conferred.
Third, other members of Congress argued that Bingham and
Shellabarger had confused personal privileges and immunities with
governmental disabilities; that Congress might enforce personal
rights, but not governmental disabilities. Representative Burchard's
discerning analysis began with the premise that the Necessary and
Proper Clause was at least as broad as Section 5. He then pointed out
that the Comity Clause in Article IV provided that "citizens are
entitled" to all privileges and immunities, whereas the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided that "a
'State is prohibited!'"264 This was an intriguing argument. Burchard
characterized the Comity Clause as protecting personal rights and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as a governmental disability, and he
found the difference important. The difference, he suggested, was
that "the power and extent of congressional enforcement as to
individuals [was] less questionable where the Constitution expressly
invests a citizen with privileges and immunities than when it simply
prohibits a State from abridging them."265 Where the Constitution
confers privileges and immunities to citizens, Congress may define or
enforce those rights through the Necessary and Proper Clause, but
262. Cong. Globe at app.160 (cited in note 1).
263. Id. at 572 (statement of Sen. Stockton). See id. at app.242 (statement of Sen. Bayard)
(finding no "affirmative grant of power" in Section 1); id. at app.259 (statement of Rep. Holman)
(arguing that Section 1 is "a positive limitation and nothing more" and not "a grant of any power
to Congress"; "[wlhere power is conferred on Congress ... it is done in express terms, or as a
necessary incident to a power of legislation expressly conferred; but here there is no power
conferred, but simply a denial of power"). See also id. at app.221 (statement of Sen. Thurman)
(arguing that Section I is similar to disabilities in Article I, Section 10, which are judicially and
not legislatively enforced); id. at app.260 (statement of Rep. Holman) (claiming that Article I,
Section 10 does not confer '"egislative power on Congress").
264. Id. at app.314.
265. Id. See id. at app.160 (statement of Rep. Golladay) (quoted in the text accompanying
note 262); id. at app.259 (statement of Rep. Holman) (arguing that Section 1 is "a denial of
power" to the states, and does not confer power to Congress; Section 5 empowers Congress with
respect to Sections 2 and 3 only, both of which contemplate some action by Congress).
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where the Constitution merely prohibits government from doing
something, the provision is only enforceable by the judiciary.
On this point Burchard had answered Shellabarger.
Shellabarger had argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
was analagous to the Fugitive Slave Clause and observed that the
Court in Prigg had implied congressional power to enforce the return
of fugitive slaves. Burchard replied, in effect, that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was, in form, more analogous to the Comity
Clauses, and that clause-even though it might be said to secure indi-
vidual rights-is not enforceable by Congress.266
Burchard's point, that because, under the original
Constitution, Congress lacked power to enforce the Comity Clause, a
fortiori, it lacked power to enforce the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, was well made when we recall that Bingham himself stated
that he had based Section 1 on the Comity and Due Process
Clauses.27 Representative Burchard concluded that Bingham's
argument regarding incorporation of the first eight amendments in
Section 1 was, if correct, at best a prohibition against the states that
the courts could enforce, and not a license to Congress.268
Finally, several members of Congress suggested that the
general power in Section 5 could not trump specific disabilities on
Congress, the First Amendment being the principal example. Senator
Bayard of Delaware argued that "an implied power to Congress" could
not overcome the Bill of Rights, which was "a distinct and affirmative
inhibition of power to Congress.269  Senator Stockton denied +that
Section 5 was a basis for enforcing the First Amendment:
266. The Court has invalidated congressional legislation attempting to enforce the Comity
Clause. See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1920); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 643-44 (1882). See also Federalist 80 (Hamilton), in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers
at 537 (cited in note 25) (stating that enforcement of the Comity Clause is committed to the
judiciary).
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1, provides a good contrast to the
Comity Clause. It provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State." By itself, the clause is fully en-
forceable by the judiciary. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 63 (1938). But the clause ex-
pressly provides that Congress "may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved and the Effect thereof." Congress has exercised this
authority. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
267. See notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
268. Cong Globe at app.314 (cited in note 1). See also id. at app.315 (recognizing that
courts have the power to set aside unconstitutional state laws).
269. Id. at app.242. Bayard quoted at length from Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 Howard)
84 (1857), and quoted verbatim the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments. He did not explain why he omitted the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments.
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No act of Congress can authorize or make a law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press. Would it be appropriate legislation to enforce this
amendment that Congress should pass an act prohibiting a State from doing so
or directing it to do so? Congress is simply restrained from doing this itself.270
Referring to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, Senator Stockton
stated that "an attempt on the part of Congress to exercise powers not
granted, and much more, powers prohibited, is a usurpation that
cannot be justified by any legislation under the fourteenth
amendment, which only restricts States in matters wherein the
Congress was already restricted.."271 Even if Bingham were correct,
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the Bill of
Rights, Congress was still disabled from enforcing the First
Amendment against the states.
c. Epilogue: The strange case of the Blaine Amendment
Only four years later Congress was again embroiled in debates
over the application of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But
the debate over the Blaine Amendment in 1876 could not have been a
greater contrast to the enforcement debates of 1871-72.272 Maine
Senator James Blaine had advocated an amendment to the
Constitution making the Religion Clauses applicable to the states and
prohibiting public funds and lands from coming under the control of
religious sects.273  The amendment passed the House easily,274 but
failed to get the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate.275
270. Cong. Globe at 572 (cited in note 1). See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 759 (1872)
(statement of Sen. Carpenter) (questioning an amendment to the proposed enforcement act
which would have prohibited exclusion on the basis of race by "trustees and officers of church
organizations": 'it is in violation of the spirit of the Constitution in that it disregards the
opinions and the motives of those who framed the Constitution .... [Ilt cannot be doubted that
they who framed the Constitution of the United States intended to, and thought they had,
carefully excluded the whole subject of religion from Federal control or interference"). See also
id. at 823-27 (colloquy between Sen. Carpenter and Sen. Sumner). The members may have had
in mind a case argued before the Court in early 1871, requesting that the Court resolve a schism
in the Presbyterian Church in Kentucky. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wallace) 679 (1872).
271. Cong. Globe at 572 (cited in note 1).
272. One explanation for the transformation is "the electoral tidal wave" in 1874 that
turned the Republicans' overwhelming control of the House to the Democrats. See Foner,
Reconstruction at 523 (cited in note 184); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 949, 1080 (1995).
273. The amendment under consideration in the House of Representatives read:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of
public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect or denomination; nor shall
any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denomi-
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The Blaine Amendment debates are notable for what was not
argued. Missing from any of the rhetorical speeches and obviously
vigorous debate was any mention of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
vehicle for already having made the Religion Clauses applicable to the
states.276 Instead, the proposed amendment--"for the first
time"277--"impos[ed] on the States what the Constitution already
imposes on the United States."2 7 8 If any members of Congress thought
the Fourteenth Amendment had already imposed the First
Amendment on the states, no one spoke up.
In fact, many members denied that the First Amendment re-
strictions could appropriately apply to the states. For some members,
applying the Religion Clauses to the states was contrary to the origi-
nal scheme, under which "freedom of conscience and the right to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of each one's individual
conviction.., was left to the States, and was not placed in the hands
or under the control of the Federal Government,"279 while for others
the amendment was harmless, if unnecessary, because there was
"[no] danger that [the states] would begin now to establish a State
religion, or begin to prohibit its exercise, or make religious belief a
test or qualification for holding office."28
nations. This article shall not vest, enlarge, or diminish legislative power in the
Congress.
4 Cong. Rec. 5190 (Aug. 4, 1876). The Senate considered a more complicated version. Id. at
5580. Background on the amendment may be found in Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 939 (1951). See also William K. Lietzau,
Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39
DePaul L. Rev. 1191, 1208-10 (1990).
274. 4 Cong. Rec. at 5191-92 (cited in note 273).
275. Id. at 5595. The vote in the Senate apparently followed party lines. Meyer, 64 Harv.
L. Rev. at 944 & n.27 (cited in note 273).
276. One member compared the proposed amendment with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments: "This [amendment] is just as clearly right as either of those... amendments." 4
Cong. Rec. at 5594 (cited in note 273) (statement of Sen. Morton).
277. Id. at 5561 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen).
278. Id. at 5245 (statement of Sen. Christiancy).
279. Id. at 5591 (statement of Sen. Bogy).
280. Id. at 5581 (statement of Sen. Kernan). See id. at 5591 (statement of Sen. Morton)
(stating that the states should not be free to establish a religion). The reference to the Religious
Test Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3, was ironic. The prior year one commentator had sug-
gested that the Clause applied to the states by virtue of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Joseph P. Thompson, Church and State in the United States 15-17
(James R. Osgood, 1873).
During the 1869 debates on the Fifteenth Amendment, John Bingham expressed concern
that a proposed amendment implied that states could establish voting qualifications, including
religious tests. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 726-27 (1869). Bingham's concern was not
inconsistent with his views on the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the First Amendment
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In the end, few disagreed that the Religion Clauses might
profitably apply to the states. What was more controversial was
whether Congress should have power to enforce the restriction. The
House proposal clearly stated that Congress would not acquire such
power through the amendment, and more vocal senators agreed that
Congress should not be dictating religious freedom to the states. 281
Whatever power to judge the First Amendment resided in the courts
alone, "a provision like this in the first article of amend-
ments... [was] to be enforced solely and [was] enforced sufficiently
by the power of the Supreme Court."28 2
2. The First and Fourteenth Amendments in the Supreme Court
With Congress unable to agree as to what it had passed, it is
not surprising that the federal courts puzzled over the Fourteenth
Amendment as well. The Court's opinions in the early Fourteenth
Amendment cases reflect many of the same arguments made in
Congress. 28 3
The post-ratification period saw subtle, but important, changes
in the Court's view of the First Amendment. In 1873 the Court inter-
preted the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time. In The
Slaughter-House Cases,284 the Louisiana legislature had given a mo-
nopoly to a New Orleans slaughterhouse. Local butchers alleged,
among other things, that the monopoly violated their privileges and
immunities as Louisiana citizens to pursue their chosen profession.
for the same reason a Fifteenth Amendment was required. Voting rights were political rights
and were not comprehended within the civil privileges and immunities of citizens.
281. 4 Cong. Rec. at 5589 (cited in note 273) (statement of Sen. Stevenson); id. at 5591
(statement of Sen. Bogy); id. at 5592 (statement of Sen. Eaton). This history is inconsistent with
the claim that Congress considered the Blaine Amendment a corrective to the Supreme Court's
construction of the Petition Clause in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
Compare Curtis, No State Shall Abridge at 169-70 (cited in note 160). There is no mention of
Cruikshank and only scant reference to amendments 'Impaired by construction." 4 Cong. Rec.
at 5585 (cited in note 273) (statement of Sen. Morton). It is unthinkable that a Congress
unhappy with the Court's interpretation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments would
propose an amendment binding the states but without the standard provision that Congress
could enforce the provision. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward A General Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1115, 1137-39 & n.125 (1988).
282. 4 Cong. Rec. at 5190 (cited in note 273) (statement of Rep. Hoar) ("[Wihere the
Constitution asserted certain rights of citizens or prohibited to the States or Congress certain
legislative powers, the right to enforce those provisions of the Constitution was left to the
courts"). Members of Congress periodically proposed amendments similar to the Blaine
Amendment for the next fifty years. See F. William O'Brien, The States and "No
Establishment: Proposed Amendments to the Constitution Since 1798, 4 Washburn L. J. 183,
210 (1965).
283. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 149 (cited in note 216).
284. 83 U.S. (16 Wallace) 36 (1873).
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The Court rejected the claim, holding that the Privilieges and
Immunities Clause only forbids the states from interfering with citi-
zens' federal rights.285 As Justice Field pointed out in dissent, the
states could not have interfered with federal privileges and immuni-
ties before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority's
reading of the Clause rendered it "a vain and idle enactment, which
accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and
the people on its passage. 286
Following the Court's decision in The Slaughter-House Cases,
the Privileges or Immunities Clause was a dead letter. The Court had
struck out in a direction neither side in Congress had proposed. The
Privileges or Immunities Clause was neither a restriction on state
abridgements of state constitutional rights (as Michael Kerr had sug-
gested)27 nor did it impose upon the states the Bill of Rights (as John
Bingham had suggested). 288 In Slaughter-House the Court had held
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause only forbids states to
abridge federal privileges or immunities, and the only First
Amendment right the Court thought sufficiently important to mention
was the Petition Clause.29 Ironically, the Petition Clause figured in
the first post-ratification case invoking the First Amendment.
In United States v. Cruikshank,290 the United States charged
Cruikshank and others with conspiracy to deprive two "citizens of the
United States, of African descent"291 from the "free exercise and en-
joyment of any right or privilege granted or secured.., by the
Constitution or laws of the United States."292 One count alleged that
Cruikshank had interfered with the right of African-American citi-
zens to peaceably assemble, which the United States contended vio-
lated the Right of Petition.293 Citing Barron, the Court commented
that the First Amendment,
285. Id. at 74-79.
286. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
287. See notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
288. See notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
289. 83 U.S. (16 Wallace) at 79. Justice Bradley, in dissent, referred to "free exercise of
religious worship, the right of free speech and a free press, [and] the right peaceably to assemble
for the discussion of public measures... as among the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States, or, what is still stronger for the force of argument, the rights of all persons,
whether citizens or not." Id. at 118-19 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
290. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
291. Id. at 548.
292. Id.
293. U.S. Const., Amend. I.
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like the other amendments proposed and adopted at the same time, was not
intended to limit the powers of the State Governments in respect to their own
citizens, but to operate upon the National government alone.... [The amend-
ments of the Bill of Rights] left the authority of the States just where they
found it, and added nothing to the already existing powers of the United
States.
294
The right to assemble was a right protected by the states. Since there
was no evidence that Cruikshank sought to prevent citizens from
petitioning the United States government, but only from assembling,
the Court dismissed the indictments on this count.295
Cruikshank seemed to have all the trappings of prior Court
decisions regarding the application of the Bill of Rights to the states.
But Cruikshank's dicta inaugurated a perceptible change in the
Court's thinking. For the first time the Supreme Court had linked
Barron with the First Amendment, a position the Court made clear in
Spies v. Illinois:296 "the first ten Articles of Amendment were not in-
tended to limit the powers of the state governments in respect to their
own people, but to operate on the National Government.... [Tihat
decision has been steadily adhered to since [inter alia, Barron]."297 It
was true enough that the First Amendment did not bind the states,
and it was also true that in Barron and succeeding cases the Court
had held that various provisions of the Bill of Rights did not apply to
the states. But the amendments did not apply to the states for very
different reasons, as the Court had recognized since Permoli.298 By
citing Barron, the Court implied that First Amendment rights were
purely personal rights, like those of the remaining amendments in the
294. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552. The Court added:
The particular Amendment now under consideration assumes the existence of the right
of the people to assemble for lawful purposes, and protects it against encroachment by
Congress. The right was not created by the Amendment; neither was its continuance
guarantied, except as against congressional interference. For their protection in its
enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the States. The power for that purpose
was originally placed there, and it has never been surrendered to the United States.
Id. See Aynes, 103 Yale L. J. at 99-100 (cited in note 194) (discussing the Court's repudiation of
the original intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment).
295. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 559.
296. 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
297. Id. at 166 (citations omitted). Significantly, the Court expressly rejected an argument
that "the first ten Amendments ... in so far as they secure and recognize fundamental
rights-common law rights-of the man, they make them privileges and immunities of the man
as a citizen of the United States, and cannot now be abridged by a State under the Fourteenth
Amendment.... [T]he Fourteenth Amendment as to such rights limits state power, as the ten
Amendments had limited Federal power." Id. See also id. at 148-53 (argument of J. Randoph
Tucker) (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause made the Bill of Rights applicable to
states).
298. See text accompanying notes 156-60. See also text accompanying notes 173-78.
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Bill of Rights. Though the difference between the First Amendment
and the remaining amendments was subtle, lost in the margin were
the last vestiges of state immunity from congressional interference
and the preferred position of the federal judiciary.
The movement strengthened when, two years after
Cruikshank, the Court decided a First Amendment case on substan-
tive rather than 'Jurisdictional" grounds. In Reynolds v. United
States,299 the United States brought criminal bigamy charges against
Mormon polygamist George Reynolds. "Congress," the Court ob-
served, "cannot pass a law for the government of the Territories which
shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. The First Amendment to
the Constitution expressly forbids such legislation. Religious freedom
is guaranteed everywhere throughout the United States, so far as
congressional interference is concerned. 30° The "precise point of the
inquiry is, what is the religious freedom which has been guaran-
teed."30 Prior First Amendment cases had been decided purely on
federalism grounds. Here, the Court had to give substantive content
to the scope of protection given individuals subject to the plenary
police powers of the federal government. Relying principally on
Jefferson's writings, the Court wrote that "Congress was deprived of
all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order.''302 The Court upheld the conviction.
In 1897 the Court began the process of absorbing certain of the
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first recog-
nized that the Due Process Clause required states to pay just compen-
sation-quite ironic in light of Barron-in Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago.3 3 Other rights followed, and it was
only a matter of time before the Court discovered that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had absorbed First
Amendment rights as well.30 4 Finally, without fanfare, the Court in
299. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
300. Id. at 162.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 164.
303. 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See also Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154-59 (1961) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (recounting the post-ratification use of Barron and the development of the
doctrine of incorporation).
304. The first Justice Harlan had argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause made
the first ten amendments, including the First, applicable to the states. Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 361-63
(1892) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Gitlow v. New York305 "assume[d]" for "present purposes... that free-
dom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the funda-
mental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States.'30 6  In these cases, as in Cruikshank, the Court drew no
distinctions between the personal liberties or immunities guaranteed
through the Fifth or Sixth Amendments and those guaranteed under
the First Amendment's disability. "[Fireedom of speech and of the
press are rights of the same fundamental character" as the
"fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal
prosecution. 3o17
In these early absorption cases, the Court specifically denied
that the Fourteenth Amendment made the First Amendment itself
applicable to the states. It rejected a "rule" that "[wihatever would be
a violation of the original bill of rights ... if done by the federal
government is now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth
Amendment if done by a state.' 3°8 For the time being the Court made
clear that the First Amendment applied only against the federal gov-
ernment, while the states were required by the Due Process Clause to
respect amorphous, non-textual rights of freedom of religion, speech,
press, and petition.
305. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530
(1922), the Court held that a Missouri statute requiring corporations to furnish dismissed
employees with statements of their employment histories and reasons for their termination did
not interfere with the freedom to contract. Id. at 542. In the course of its decision the Court
remarked that "as we have stated, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision
of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restrictions about 'freedom
of speech' or the 'liberty of silence."' Id. at 543. The Court in Gitlow dismissed this statement
as "incidental." 268 U.S. at 666. But see Cohen, 366 U.S. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(implying that Gitlow was inconsistent with Cheek).
306. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. Gitlow was followed by De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 707 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927). See also Whitney, 274 U.S. at
373 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386 (1927); Hamilton v. Regents of
the University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 261-62 (1934); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256-
57 (1937). An early history of incorporation of the First Amendment may be found in John
Raeburn Green, The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and the States, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 608
(1949).
307. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244.
308. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). See Jerold H. Israel, Selective
Incorporation: Revisited, 71 Georgetown L. J. 253, 290-92 (1982) (describing the movement
from "absorption" to "selective incorporation"); Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on
"Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
78 Harv. L. Rev. 746, 747-48 (1965) (distinguishing "absorption" from "incorporation"). But see
Cohen, 366 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the idea of "absorption": "surely it
blinks reality to pretend that the specific [right] selected for application is not really being
applied").
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For several years, the Court reaffirmed the abstract nature of
the rights of religion and expression applicable to the states through
the Due Process Clause,39 although it was undoubtedly reaching the
same results it would have under the First Amendment. When the
Court eventually concluded that personal rights of religion and ex-
pression against state governments and the federal government were
coextensive, 310 it was an easy step to declare that the text of the First
Amendment bound the states as well.3" This move anchored the right
in some text. Instead of speaking of vague, unwritten rights of
religious liberty and freedom of expression, the Court could state that
the First Amendment itself applied to the states. Just as important,
this shift provided a legislative history to which the Court could
refer.3 2 By 1947 the transformation of the personal privilege held
309. As examples of cases where the Court has stated that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the right of free expression from state interference, see Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395, 396-97 (1953); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
310. For a time several justices expressed the view that the Constitution did not exact the
same standard from the states as it did from the federal government. See, for example,
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 456 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 169-70 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 503 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas,
390 U.S. 676, 706 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 288-91 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
For Justices Harlan and Jackson, the dual standard approach was consonant with the way
in which the First Amendment had come to apply to the states. According to Justice Harlan it
was "plainly consistent with the language of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and ... more responsive to the proper functioning of a federal system." Memoirs, 383 U.S. at
456 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Dissenting in Beauharnais, Justice Jackson made the argument
that at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment state constitutions recognized criminal libel
laws:
Certainly this tolerance of state libel laws by the very authors and partisans of the
Fourteenth Amendment shows either that they were not intending to incorporate the
First Amendment or that they believed it would not prevent federal libel laws. Adoption
of the incorporation theory today would lead to the dilemma of either confining the
States as closely as the Congress or giving the Federal Government the latitude appro-
priate to state governments.
343 U.S. at 294 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
311. See, for example, West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)
("The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides
with the principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is
involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohi-
bitions of the First become its standard"); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) ("[T]he
First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law 'abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.' It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit
language... will allow" (footnote omitted)).
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against the states from an abstract, non-textual right to a First
Amendment right was made complete with the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause. 'The First Amendment, as made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth, commands that a state 'shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.' "313 Today, the Court has unhesitatingly applied the
text of the First Amendment to the states, 314 with virtually no
acknowledgment of the federalism, 3 5 much less the separation of
powers,31 6 concerns that brought about its form.
312. See, for example, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983) (finding that history
demonstrates that the Founders intended to allow prayer at the opening of legislative sessions);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (finding that the history of the colonial period
informed the understanding of the origins of religious liberty). See also Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.
Ct. 2649, 2668-70, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (finding that history shows
that the Founders intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit non-preferential aid to
religion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding that
the history of the Establishment Clause shows that the Founders did not intend to create a rigid
separation between church and state); School Dist. ofAbington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (reviewing history to conclude that the "Framers meant the
Establishment Clause to prohibit more than the creation of an established federal church");
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 215 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (observing that, prior to adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, American citizens
had supported prohibition on state supported religious instruction).
313. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8 (footnote omitted). See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court, The Second Century, 1888-1986 at 338-40 (U. Chicago, 1990) ("The text [of the
Establishment Clause] did not lend itself to incorporation.... It was not obvious that an
establishment of religion as such would deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property'" (footnote
omitted)).
314. See, for example, Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2661 (1992); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 48-49 (1985);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309-10 (1952). Indeed, in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983), the Court resorted to the history of Congress's use of chaplains in order to uphold
Nebraska's similar practice. In the process, the Court fended off the claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment "impos[ed] more stringent First Amendment limits on the states than the
draftsmen imposed on the Federal Government." Id. at 790-91.
315. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276-77 (1964) (stating that there
was "no force in [the] argument that the constitutional limitations implicit in the history of the
Sedition Act apply only to Congress and not to the States"); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 254-55 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the original motivation for the Establishment Clause
was "historical anachronism by 1868, [and] cannot be thought to have deterred the absorption of
the Establishment Clause"); Cohen, 366 U.S. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (admitting that
there were "considerations of federalism," but these should not "overbear the weighty
arguments in favor of their application to the States"). But see Note, Rethinking the
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1700, 1709
(1992) ("[Niot only is it impossible for the Establishment Clause to be incorporated while
accurately reflecting its original federalist purpose, but it also cannot be incorporated without
eviscerating its raison d'etre" (footnote omitted)).
316. The Supreme Court finally dispossessed itself of whatever power to issue prior re-
straints it had and extended the First Amendment to the judiciary. See Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415 (1971); Carroll v. President of Princess Anne County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). See also
Near, 283 U.S. at 712-20, 722-23 (holding that freedom of the press was infringed by a state
statute that allowed the enjoining of literature found to be a nuisance).
Justices have occasionally referred to specific departments of governments when discussing
the applicability of the First Amendment. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (1940) ('The
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IV. THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS: FORGOTTEN TEXT
AND MODERN THEORIES
A. The Textual Basis for Incorporation
As we did with the First Amendment, it is not enough that we
ask, "what did the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intend?"
Members of the Thirty-ninth and succeeding Congresses had such
very different views as to what they had done that it will be difficult
to find a consensus, even among those who favored the amendment.
Even if we can reach an opinion in our own minds as to their inten-
tions, we must ask whether they were successful. 317 To understand
the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the First Amendment, we
must have a theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, because if we
conclude that some kind of incorporation was intended and achieved,
then the theory of incorporation we adopt may have consequences for
Congress's powers under Section 5. Of the three clauses of Section 1,
I am only aware of two, the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the
Due Process Clause, that have been cited as the mechanism by which
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights.
1. The Privileges or Immunities Clause
Let us start with the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the
question of whether that guarantee is an equality-based provision, as
Thaddeus Stevens and others argued, or a substantive provision, as
Jacob Howard and John Bingham claimed. Although The Slaughter-
House Cases seem to have eviscerated the Privileges or Immunities
Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress
to enact such laws"). However, there is no indication that any justice thought the First
Amendment binding on the legislature alone. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 286 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Freedom of speech... is a negation of power on the part of each and
every department of government').
317. "As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which
most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who
framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1, 188 (1824). See also id. at 232 (Johnson, J., concurring) ("One half the
doubts in life arise from the defects of language).
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Clause, there is renewed interest in the Clause;318 for those favoring
incorporation, there is substantial evidence that if the Framers
intended some kind of incorporation, they intended to accomplish it
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.319
a. The Privileges or Immunities Clause as a mandate for
substantive rights
The predominant view of the Fourteenth Amendment is that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is a substantive clause, guaran-
teeing against the states a body of rights.320 These rights may be vari-
ously determined and may include some or all of the first eight
amendments, other constitutional guarantees, and natural rights.321
Of those theories that conclude the Privileges or Immunities Clause
works some kind of incorporation, most of the arguments rest on
incorporation as historical fact; that is, that the Framers thought they
were incorporating some or all of the first eight amendments through
the Clause.22
Few have attempted to explain precisely how the Privileges or
Immunities Clause accomplishes incorporation. The one notable
exception is Akhil Amar, who has offered a carefully plotted analysis
of the Clause's text to demonstrate that the Framers both intended
and accomplished incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.32 3 According to Professor Amar, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause guaranteed against the states all personal privileges or
immunities in the Bill of Rights. The catch is that not everything in
318. See, for example, Curtis, No State Shall Abridge (cited in note 160); John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L. J. 1385 (1992); Amar, 101 Yale
L. J. at 1193 (cited in note 73); Bishop, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 142 (cited in note 237).
319. Curtis, No State Shall Abridge at 215-19 (cited in note 160); Amar, 101 Yale L. J. at
1218-26 (cited in note 73).
320. See, for example, the comments of Sen. Matthew Carpenter: 'The fourteenth
amendment assumes that there are certain privileges and immunities belonging to the citizens
of the United States, and it declares that no State shall abridge those privileges and
immunities.... [T]o abridge the rights of any citizen it must follow that the privileges and
immunities of all citizens must be the same." Cong. Globe at 762 (cited in note 270).
321. See Harrison, 101 Yale L. J. at 1393-96 (cited in note 318) (surveying a number of
theories about the scope of the clause).
322. The best known proponent of this view is Justice Black, who concluded that his "study
of the historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment" persuaded him that "the
provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended.., to
make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
323. Amar, 101 Yale L. J. at 1218-26 (cited in note 73).
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the Bill of Rights is a personal privilege or immunity. 24 What is not a
personal privilege or immunity? Professor Amar acknowledges that
certain amendments, notably the First, Second, and Seventh, have a
strong federalism component and pose severe problems for the total
incorporation theorists, and he begins with the Establishment
Clause.325
Professor Amar recognizes the dilemma posed by the First
Amendment. His approach is worthy of extended consideration be-
cause his analysis of this issue is the most important work to date
marrying historical and textual rigor.
The First Amendment explicitly speaks of "right[s" and "freedom[s"
(entitlements also known as "privileges" and "immunities"), and the
Amendment's words that these rights "shall" not be "abridgfed]" by 'law"
perfectly harmonize with their echoes in the key sentence of Section One....
Of course, federalism played an important role in the original First
Amendment, but not in a way that impedes incorporation of its explicit rights
and freedoms.... [N]othing about incorporation takes away state legislatures'
freedom of speech; incorporation simply limits their freedom to use state law to
silence ordinary citizens, and that freedom is not in any way protected by the
First Amendment. For example, the Amendment nowhere forbids Congress to
"make any law protecting freedom of speech" and so on against repressive state
action. On the contrary, a strong argument can be made that Congress was
empowered and perhaps required to pass precisely these sorts of laws to vindi-
cate the Article IV guarantee that each state would have a republican govern-
ment.
3 26
Professor Amar concludes that the term "Congress" presents no
"stumbling block to incorporation," although he admits that "the
federalism aspect of First Amendment absolutism does not sensibly
incorporate against states."327 To this he suggests a solution short of
failing to incorporate the First Amendment: "[T]he First Amendment
might constrain Congress more strictly than the Fourteenth
constrains states," a solution he suggests if "taken seriously" might
324. Id. at 1232, 1264-66. Amar would also include personal privileges or immunities found
in the original Constitution, such as the right to Habeas Corpus. Id. at 1220-21.
325. Id. at 1260-62, 1266. See also Amar, 100 Yale L. J. at 1157-60 (cited in note 40)
(discussing federalism and the religion clauses).
326. Amar, 101 Yale L. J. at 1273 (cited in note 73) (footnotes omitted). See Cong. Globe at
1629 (cited in note 189) (statement of Rep. Hart) (arguing that the Guaranty Clause requires
that the states recognize First Amendment rights). See also Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure
and Relationship in Constitutional Law 39-42 (L.S.U., 1969). The argument regarding the
Guaranty Clause as applied to religion was made, unsuccessfully, by counsel in Permoli, and it
was rejected during the ratification debates in 1789. See note 151 and accompanying text.
327. Amar, 101 Yale L. J. at 1274 (cited in note 73) (footnote omitted).
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"permit differential treatment of state and federal governments."'32 8
He also recognizes that 'Jot for jot" incorporation of the First
Amendment-which at least John Bingham proposed-creates a seri-
ous problem when we get to deciding just what the substantive guar-
antee of the First Amendment is. If the First Amendment really con-
firmed that Congress lacked enumerated power over religion, speech,
and press, "we must not assume that state governments also neces-
sarily lack power-for perhaps Congress is denied a particular power
precisely because the Constitution meant to leave it to the states.329
Let us begin with the question Professor Amar poses as core to
his argument: Does the First Amendment plausibly include personal
privileges and immunities belonging to citizens? The answer is "Of
course it does." The disability imposed on Congress necessarily im-
plies the existence of a privilege or immunity in someone else.
Citizens of the United States are undoubtedly possessors of a privil-
ege or immunity against Congress. Professor Amar gave the right
answer to the question he asked, but he has asked the wrong
question, or at least an incomplete question. Because the First
Amendment is a disability, we must ask who possesses the
corresponding privilege or immunity. And when we answer that
people possess a privilege or immunity, we must inquire whether
there is any one else who possesses a privilege or immunity. The
answer again is "Of course: the states."330 Asking whether religious
freedom is a personal privilege or immunity is simply to ask what
persons would be burdened if the law were otherwise. If we only ask
if persons may claim the privilege331 then we miss entirely those
promises made to the states. 332
Once we admit that the states have equal claim to a privilege
or immunity against Congress, it makes the entire First Amendment
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1275.
330. Even the Establishment Clause can be characterized as protecting a personal privilege
or immunity. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2649-50 (holding that a high school graduation prayer
violates the establishment clause rights of students); Jaftree, 472 U.S. at 48-61 (holding that a
statute prescribing a moment of silence violates the establishment clause rights of students).
See also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 230-304 (Brennan, J., concurring). In some states an established
religion meant a difference in the tax bill. It is hard to imagine a more personal liability.
331. "[Rlights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms,
guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights." Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (footnote omitted). See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)
(characterizing the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights and
liberties).
332. Professor Mayton has concluded that the form of the First Amendment-a disability or
"no-power"----primarily establish[es] speech as a common good rather than a personal right."
Mayton, 3 Win. & Mary Bill of Rights L. J. at 405 (cited in note 66).
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a poor candidate for any textually rigorous theory of incorporation
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. And that is a problem
that is unique to the First Amendment.333 The remainder of Amend-
ments Two through Eight are properly described as "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States. '3 4 Barron was necessary
precisely because the Founders stated the Fifth Amendment as a per-
sonal privilege or immunity, and the Court had to determine against
whom the privilege or immunity was effective. The Court had no such
difficulty with the First Amendment in Permoli.335 If Professor Amar
is correct that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is a substantive
guarantee, that Clause, though far from ideal, is an adequate means
of incorporating the personal privileges or immunities contained in
Amendments Two through Eight, but it is an inadequate mechanism
for incorporating the First Amendment.
The argument I have made here, as a matter of text and his-
tory, is more easily made for the Religion Clauses than it is for the
Speech, Press, and Petition Clauses.3 6 The Founders were successful
in confirming the absolute lack of power in Congress to make laws
respecting establishment, and, consequently, from saying anything
about free exercise in the states. 7 If they intended a similar subject-
matter disqualification with respect to speech, press, and petition,
they were, as we have seen from the debates over the Sedition Act,
not as successful. In response to Professor Amar's view that the
states had no first amendment freedom to silence ordinary
citizens-to take the worst scenario-Jefferson would have answered
that Congress had no power to stop the states from doing so, and, if
that were not sufficient, the First Amendment prevented Congress
from meddling. Madison and Jefferson based their opposition to the
Sedition laws on the lack of power in Congress, not on Congress's folly
333. As Professor Harrison aptly put it, "Incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause turns on whether the definition of a right of distinctively national citizenship includes its
label. If we read it with the label on, the First Amendment creates a right to be free from
congressional abridgments of the freedom of speech. If we read it without the label, the First
Amendment protects the freedom of speech." Harrison, 101 Yale L. J. at 1466 (cited in note
318).
334. I leave to others the problem of the Second Amendment. See Amar, 101 Yale L. J. at
1261-62, 1264-66 (cited in note 73) (discussing incorporation and the Second Amendment);
Amar, 100 Yale L. J. at 1162-73 (cited in note 40) (addressing federalism and the meaning of the
Second Amendment).
335. See text accompanying notes 146-60.
336. See Amar, 100 Yale L. J. at 1157-58 (cited in note 40) (observing the difference
between incorporating the Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause).
337. See text accompanying notes 73, 80-99.
19951 1609
1610 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 48:1539
in wishing to suppress political speech. 38 Undoubtedly Jefferson
would have opposed any similar attempt by the Virginia legislature,
but he would have argued on substantive rather than on jurisdictional
grounds.339 For want of an Establishment Clause analog for speech
and press, Amar's argument stands on somewhat stronger grounds
with respect to the Speech and Press Clauses, but his theory must
still get around the fact that the First Amendment disability is unique
to Congress.1o
b. The Privileges or Immunities Clause as a mandate for
equal privileges or immunities
The equality reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
postulates that "the actual content of the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States is given by positive law, state and na-
tional, rather than by the Fourteenth Amendment." 1 According to
this view, the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not have inde-
pendent content; it does not refer to a fixed body of rights, which the
states may not abridge. Rather, it holds that whatever positive rights
338. See note 130; text accompanying notes 130-41. The First Amendment might not
expressly forbid Congress from making laws regarding the free exercise of religion, but
Congress must still find an enumerated power to do so. Indeed, recall that Hamilton and others
argued that since there was no source for such a power in Article I, the First Amendment was
superfluous at best, and, at worst, might imply the existence of such a power. Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment might cure this defect. But it grants power to Congress only if freedom
of speech and press, and the right of petition are exclusively personal privileges or immunities.
Otherwise, the Court in Slaughter-House would be correct, at least with respect to the First
Amendment, that the Privileges or Immunities Clause forbids the states from interfering with
federal rights. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wallace) at 77.
339. See Joel F. Hansen, Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical
Examination of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 645, 672-74 (concluding that
Jefferson argued for vigorous separation with respect to the national government, but was more
flexible with respect to state governments).
340. Professor Amar's claim that First Amendment incorporation only restricts the states
from silencing citizens, and that the Amendment does not forbid Congress from making laws
protecting speech, conflates two separate issues. See Amar, 101 Yale L. Rev. at 1273 (cited in
note 73). The first is whether the First Amendment protects the states' power to silence
citizens. That appears to have been its intent, although I have questioned whether the
Founders were successful in this.
Second, whatever the answer to the foregoing question, it is distinct from asking whether
Congress may make laws protecting speech in the states. Compare Levy, 32 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at
207 n.156 (cited in note 100) (stating that Congress cannot "abridg[e] the power of the states to
abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press" (emphasis omitted)) with Anderson, 30 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. at 507-08 (cited in note 79) (stating that Congress can "abridge] the power of the states
to abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press" (emphasis omitted)).
341. Harrison, 101 Yale L. J. at 1393 (cited in note 318). See Nelson, The Fourteenth
Amendment at 118 (cited in note 216) ("Understanding section one as an instrument for the
equal, rather than absolute, protection of rights resolves the contradictions in the evidence that
has so puzzled historians").
TAKING LIBERTIES
are found, for example, in state tort, contract, or property law are
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, which states
cannot abridge. A state abridges the privileges or immunities of
United States citizens, not when it alters its substantive law, but
when it enacts laws that "take rights away from a class of
individuals. 342  This view, according to its proponents, has the
advantage of demonstrating how the Fourteenth Amendment wrote
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 into the Constitution,343 while answering
the critics' claim that the amendment would result in uniform
national laws.3 4 The Privileges or Immunities Clause protects classes
of people rather than classes of rights.
The equality-based view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
casts a pall on the claim of jot-for-jot incorporation because it incorpo-
rates by reference state law. The theory, however, is not as unpalat-
able or inconsistent with the Framers' concerns over the Southern
states' infringement of first amendment freedoms as it might seem.
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution had no
authoritative substantive content in 1866. Other than Permoli, in
which the Court merely confirmed that the First Amendment did not
apply to state laws,34  there was no Supreme Court decision
interpreting the First Amendment, and there would not be such a
decision until ten years after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since the last state, Massachusetts, disincorporated its
church in 1833, there was no reason to believe that state guarantees
of free exercise of religion or rights of conscience, or whatever phrase
the states had employed in their individual constitutions, were
substantively different from the federal Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses.36 The same thing would be true of the Speech and
Press Clauses.37 What would have concerned Congress was that
342. Harrison, 101 Yale L. J. at 1421 (cited in note 318).
343. See Cong. Globe at 2498 (cited in note 189) (statement of Rep. Broomall) (stating that
the Amendment puts the Civil Rights Act into the Constitution); id. at 2502 (statement of Rep.
Raymond) (stating that the amendment gives Congress the power to enact a civil rights bill); id.
at 2511 (statement of Rep. Eliot) (stating that Section 1 will give Congress "the power to
prohibit State legislation discriminating against classes of citizens").
344. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 119 (cited in note 216).
345. To Permoli we might add that the Supreme Court had given effect to state establish-
ment, Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815), and acknowledged the role Christianity
played in state common law, Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 Howard) at 127. See note 146.
346. See McConnell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1503-11 (cited in note 48) (discussing the
interpretations found in various Free Exercise cases).
347. See, for example, Justice Jackson's reliance on state criminal libel laws at the passage
of the Reconstruction amendments. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 292-94 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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state religion, speech, press, and petition clauses were not enforced,
or were enforced unequally.
An equality-based interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment would suggest that what Congress had the power to
enforce was the prohibition of unequal state enforcement of the states'
own so-called First Amendment guarantees, whether the inequality
was based on race or some other fact.348 In that sense the Privileges
or Immunities Clause could bring federal enforcement of state First
Amendment provisions to the extent that the states did not guarantee
those provisions equally to all citizens. However, it would not justify
the claim that the federal courts or Congress could dictate the content
of First Amendment rights or require uniform results, any more than
the courts or Congress could dictate uniform property laws. This view
appears to be consistent with Thomas Cooley's contemporaneous
reading of Section 1: "[Ilt may be doubtful whether the further provi-
sions of the same section surround the citizen with any protections
additional to those before possessed under the State Constitutions;
but.., a principle of State constitutional law has now been made a
part of the Constitution of the United States.' ' 9 It is also consistent
with Thaddeus Stevens's construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment,350 as well as the construction supplied by others,
including some who went to great lengths to try to understand John
Bingham's views.35'
2. The Due Process Clause
As we saw in the post-ratification history of the Supreme
Court's construction of the First Amendment, two fairly distinct theo-
ries of the First Amendment emerged under the Due Process Clause:
"absorption" and "incorporation."
348. See Harrison, 101 Yale L. J. at 1465 (cited in note 318) ('The privileges and immuni-
ties of state citizenship include state constitutional protections, many of which are similar in
subject matter to those contained in the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution.
States may not, therefore, discriminate with respect to those rights").
349. Thomas Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *294 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1871), quoted in
Aynes, 103 Yale L. J. at 92 (cited in note 194). See also Thomas Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations 25 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1878) (arguing that the Sixth and Seventh Amendments
do not apply to States). Professor Aynes suggests that Cooley simply did not see any conflict
between federal constitutional principles and state constitutional principles. Aynes, 103 Yale L.
J. at 92 n.228. He may be correct. See Cooley, Constitutional Limitations at 584 (discussing
religious liberty and "[tihose things which are not lawful under any of the American
constitutions"), and this would support an equality-based reading.
350. See text accompanying notes 218-21.
351. See, for example, sources listed in note 258.
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a. The Due Process Clause and "absorption" of the First
Amendment
The absorption theory, which counts among its theorists oppo-
nents of incorporation such as Felix Frankfurter and Charles
Fairman,35 2 eschews the textual rigor of the privileges or immunities
clause theorists. It will frustrate anyone who believes that the text,
rather than unspecified principles, defines the rules. The absorption
theory is not dependent on the views of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor does it depend on the structure of the text of the
first eight amendments, or in fact on the text of any amendment or
law. Instead, it has its origins in Lochner.13 This theory contends
that the Due Process Clause incorporates certain fundamental rights
against the states, some of which were also enumerated in the Bill of
Rights and applied against the federal government.
In some respects, the absorption theory of the Due Process
Clause is consistent with the equality theory of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
could not have agreed on the content of the First Amendment any
more than the Founders could have. There was no body of law on
which they could rely (at least no federal body of law). Perhaps a
theory of the Due Process Clause as a guarantee of certain fundamen-
tal rights, rather than as a guarantee of the Bill of Rights, suggests
that the states must provide and enforce some kind of First-
Amendment-type rights. So long as the states provide those rights,
they have not denied any person due process, and there is no occasion
for federal interference. Such a theory would allow for some flexibil-
ity in the standard, permitting modest variations in the state applica-
tions. As the Supreme Court relinquished "absorption" and moved
towards more formal "incorporation,"' 54 Section 1 incorporated a sub-
stantive federal right and therefore prescribed national uniformity, a
result not necessary to due process.
352. Exemplary discussions of these views can be found in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 67 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and Fairman, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 138-39 (cited in
note 60).
353. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, The Second Century at 155 (cited in
note 313). See also United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1937) ('There
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth!).
354. See notes 303-16 and accompanying text.
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The challenges to substantive due process theories generally
are well documented. For our purposes, the defects are plain. The
due process theory of absorption succeeds only if all first amendment
rights are exclusively personal rights because the theory must deny
that there are any residual state rights or federalism concerns in the
First Amendment. In sum, the theory posits that the Fourteenth
Amendment amended the First Amendment without so much as fair
warning that that was its function. Absorption does not rely on the
text or history of the First Amendment, and it finds virtually no
support in the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
b. The Due Process Clause and "incorporation" of the First
Amendment
The current theory of "incorporation" of the First Amendment
claims the Due Process Clause makes selected clauses of the first
eight amendments (including the entire First Amendment) applicable
to the states. 355 Like the absorption theory, incorporation does not
claim its provenance from the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Unlike that theory, however, the incorporation theory posits the jot-
for-jot adoption of the text of the First Amendment.356 Once the Court
incorporated the text of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth, it
made the history of the First Amendment its own as well.357 As a
result, the incorporation theory is a strange amalgam of history and
fiction: It is historical with respect to the First Amendment, but
ahistorical with respect to the Fourteenth; it recognizes the legitimacy
of the tools of original intent where the First Amendment is
concerned, but scorns it with respect to the Fourteenth.
The incorporation theory is perhaps the least acceptable of the
theories applying the First Amendment (or first-amendment-type
rights) to the states because it is unable to account for the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment.358 And, having accepted the text and
history of the First Amendment, it is unwilling to recognize the First
Amendment for what it was. As with the absorption theory, the in-
corporation theory must ignore the federalism and separation of
355. The theory counts among its more prominent defenders Justice Brennan. See William
J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, speech given
at Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in 27 S. Tex. L. J. 433, 441 (1986); William
J. Brennan Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 769-78 (1961).
356. See notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
357. See notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
358. Henkin, 73 Yale L. J. at 77, 88 (cited in note 60).
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powers concerns that motivated adoption of the First Amendment,
and it ignores them with a vengeance.
3. Reconstructing the First Amendment: The Consequences of Text
and Theory
Obviously much is at stake in our choice of theories on
Section 1. The more textually and historically rigorous the theory of
incorporation, the stronger becomes the case for incorporation, but the
more closely we must examine the history of the First Amendment's
form and substance. The more willing we are to find broad
constitutional emanations in Section 1 that do not incorporate 'Jot for
jot" the guarantees in the Bill of Rights, the less we can complain
when Congress decides to prescribe uniform laws.
A substantive theory of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
and the orthodox reading of the Due Process Clause as the source of
incorporation lead to substantive First Amendment rights, and these
theories raise interesting questions regarding whether Congress may
not only enforce but dictate the substance of First Amendment rights.
By contrast, an equality-based theory would not lead to substantive
rights. Although an equality-based theory would not deprive
Congress of any role in enforcing the guarantees of religious liberty
and freedom of expression, it would certainly alter current notions of
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under an
equality-based provision, Congress lacks power to prescribe
substantive First Amendment standards, but it retains the power to
make and enforce laws against states that failed to respect the state's
own guarantees of religious liberty and freedom of speech, press, and
petition. Accordingly, a state violates Section 1 when it either
restricts the rights of some of its citizens through positive law, or fails
to protect some citizens in the exercise of those rights.359
Any theory incorporating the First Amendment into the
Fourteenth Amendment must deal with the federalism and separa-
359. Additionally, Congress would retain the power to enforce federal rights where the
states directly interfered with federal rights; for example, if a state punished a petition to the
federal government. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53 (finding that the right to petition
Congress is an "attribute of national citizenship" and thus lies "Within the scope of the
sovereignty of the United States"). See also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wallace) at
79 (discussing the right of petition); Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's
Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on The Meaning of the First
Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 1113, 1135 n.103 (1993) (discussing
constitutional protection of the right to petition Congress).
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tion of powers concerns inherent in the First. For example,
Jefferson's metaphor of the "wall of separation" makes sense when
coupled with his strict views of the enumerated powers of Congress,
but it is not useful as a standard for judging state laws under the
Establishment Clause. The same is true, but to a lesser degree, for
the Free Exercise, Free Speech, Free Press, and Right of Petition
Clauses. Those clauses come much closer to having some substantive
content, but from the beginning they lacked the kind of definition or
development that state constitutions in 1789, or even in 1868,
contained.3 60 It is thus not at all clear what incorporation of the First
Amendment brings upon the states, except the oversight of the
Supreme Court, and perhaps Congress, both of which have no guid-
ance other than a rule which provides that Congress shall make no
rules.
B. Section 5 and the Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment
Even if we were convinced that Section 1 made the First
Amendment applicable to the states, there is still the question of what
enforcement powers Congress acquired in Section 5. As we saw in
Part III, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment agreed on little
beyond the fact of passage of the Amendment itself, and the debates
over Section 5 occasioned no more agreement than the debates over
Section 1. Several different theories emerge from those debates and
from the Section 5 cases that have followed. I briefly consider the
implications of three of these theories.
1. Judicial Enforcement of Section 1
A number of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
garded Section 1 as self-executing like the First Amendment. The
disabilities in Section 1 forbid the states from enacting certain kinds
of laws, and if the states enact such laws the judiciary stood to declare
the laws unconstitutional. These proponents believed Section 1 was
complete without further response by Congress. 361 Indeed, since
Section 1 confers no power on Congress, not only was there no
occasion for Congress to act to enforce Section 1, but also the
360. See, for example, discussions of early state religion clauses in McConnell, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. at 1455-66 (cited in note 48); Report to the Attorney General at 4-10 (cited in note 57).
361. Cong. Globe at app.117 (cited in note 1) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth) ('rhe first
Section of the amendment requires no legislation; 'it is a law unto itself;' and the Courts can
execute it').
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Constitution prohibits Congress from doing so. Representative
Holman argued that Section 1 was a "positive limitation and nothing
more," and upon its violation, no one should "doubt the completeness
of the remedy .... The Supreme Court will declare the law void."382
This theory confines the scope of Section 5, but does not nullify
it. According to the theory's proponents, Section l's limitations on
state action-similar to those found in Section 10 of Article I-do not
confer power upon Congress. Instead, Section 5 facilitated Sections 2
and 3, which authorized Congress to apportion representatives and to
relieve those disabled from holding public office for having "engaged
in insurrection or rebellion. 363
The problem with this crabbed reading of Section 5 is not that
it is too technical, but that it is not technical enough and did not sur-
vive Ex Parte Virginia. It nevertheless merits further examination.
In Ex Parte Virginia,64 a state judge was charged with excluding
black citizens from grand and petit juries, in violation of federal law.
The Court upheld the judge's conviction and the power of Congress
under Section 5 to make such conduct criminal.365
It is not said the judicial power of the general government shall extend to en-
forcing the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities guaran-
teed. It is not said that branch of the government shall be authorized to de-
clare void any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the power
of Congress which has been enlarged[.] Congress is authorized to enforce the
prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to
make the amendments fully effective. Whatever legislation is appropriate,
that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, what-
ever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure
to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of congressional power.
366
362. Id. at app.259. See id. at app.314-15 (statement of Rep. Burchard). See also Ex Parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 361 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting) ('The provision authorizing Congress to
enforce [the 13th and 14th Amendments] does not enlarge their scope, nor confer any authority
which would not have existed independently of it").
363. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 3. See Cong. Globe at app.117 (cited in note 1) (statement
of Rep. Farnsworth) ("There are other provisions in that amendment which require legislation
by Congress. Apportioning Representatives and relieving from disabilities by Congress are
required by the amendment").
364. 100 U.S. 399 (1879).
365. Id. at 348-49.
366. Id. at 345-46. See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)
(Fifteenth Amendment); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (Thirteenth
Amendment).
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The Court agreed with some members of Congress that Section 5 was
"equivalent ' .6 7 to the Necessary and Proper Clause, and authorized
Congress to enact legislation where the Constitution permitted it.
The analogy between the Necessary and Proper Clause was
inevitable because of the striking similarities in their wording. The
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress "power" as "necessary
and proper" to "make laws" for the "carrying into execution" of the
"powers" of the federal government.3 68  Section 5 grants Congress
"power" as "appropriate" to enact "legislation" to "enforce" the
"provisions" of the amendment.36 9
There are two key differences between the Necessary and
Proper Clause and Section 5. First, the Necessary and Proper Clause
is the power to "execute," seemingly a broader term than "enforce."
The term "enforce" suggests that a violation of Section 1 is a condition
precedent to the use of the Section 5 powers, but it does not limit
enforcement to the judiciary.370  Second, the Necessary and Proper
Clause only gives Congress the power to facilitate "powers" of the
government, while in Section 5 it may enforce the "provisions" of the
Fourteenth Amendment, irrespective of whether those provisions
consist of "powers" or something else. As the first Justice Harlan
pointed out in dissent in The Civil Rights Cases, Section 5 is "to en-
force 'the provisions of this article' of amendment; not simply those of
a prohibitive character, but the provisions--all of the provi-
sions-affirmative and prohibitive, of the amendment. ' ' 71 In this re-
gard, Section 5 is broader than the Necessary and Proper Clause.
A necessary and proper clause does not operate in a vacuum; it
is not a free-standing power, but must operate on something else.
The Necessary and Proper Clause, in and of itself, would not permit
enforcement of the First Amendment, because the First Amendment
is not a grant of power to the federal government. For similar
reasons, the Necessary and Proper Clause would not authorize
367. Cong. Globe at app.87 (cited in note 1) (statement of Rep. Storm).
368. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
369. Id. Amend. XIV, § 5.
370. See generally Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional
Rights, Can Congress Save Us?: An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1029 (1993). See also Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 39 (1995).
371. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 46 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Gary Lawson
and Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation
of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L. J. 267, 311 n.189 (1993) (comparing the enforcement
provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Necessary and Proper Clause).
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enforcement of Section 1. It would thus leave enforcement of Section
l's provisions to the judiciary.372 The same cannot be said of Section
5.
2. Remedial Congressional Enforcement of Section 1
A second view of Section 5 suggests that there is some role for
Congress to enforce Section 1, but that the primary role belongs to the
judiciary. Congress might act, but only once the judiciary has deter-
mined that a state had violated Section 1. As Senator Norwood
stated, "[Ulntil a State shall attempt to abridge [a citizen's] rights,
Congress has no power to act."3 73  And Representative Garfield,
speaking of complaints of "systematic maladministration" of the laws,
stated that "[w]henever such a state of facts is clearly made
out, ... the last clause of the first section empowers Congress to step
in and provide for doing justice to those persons who are thus denied
equal protection. 374
This is substantially the second Justice Harlan's position in
Katzenbach v. Morgan.375 In Morgan the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.376 That sec-
tion prevented the states from denying any person's right to vote
simply because that person could not read or write English. The law
had the effect of nullifying state English literacy requirements,
requirements which seven years earlier the Court held did not violate
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.377 The Morgan Court held
that its prior decision was "inapposite" and that the question before
the Court was, "[w]ithout regard to whether the judiciary" would find
372. See Harris, 106 U.S. at 639 (stating that Section 1 of "the amendment imposes no duty
and confers no power upon Congress").
373. 2 Cong. Rec. app.244 (April 30 and May 4, 1874). See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
at 11 (finding that Section 5 vests Congress with authority "[tlo adopt appropriate legislation for
correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them
effectually null").
374. Cong. Globe at app.143 (cited in note 1). Garfield also thought that if Congress
provided for appeal from state courts to federal courts, that would "cover[ ] nearly all the ground
that needs to be covered in time of peace." Id.
375. 384 U.S. 641, 659-71 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
226, 260 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's section 5 enforcement was
appropriate only "where a violation lurks"). See also Richmond v. J.A Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
490-91 (1989) (O'Connor, J., writing for the Court).
376. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1988).
377. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959) (holding that a North
Carolina statute requiring that all prospective voters be able to read and write English did not
on its face violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
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an English literacy requirement violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
"could Congress prohibit the enforcement of the state law" through
Section 5.378 The Court answered that Congress could.
Justice Harlan dissented. 'WVhen recognized state violations of
federal constitutional standards have occurred, Congress is of course
empowered by [Section] 5 to take appropriate remedial measures,"
but it is a 'Judicial question whether the condition with which
Congress has thus sought to deal is in truth an infringement of the
Constitution," and thus, "the necessary prerequisite to bringing the
[section] 5 power into play at all."1 79 As Justice Harlan explained,
without the threshold judicial finding, "Congress would be able to
qualify this Court's constitutional decisions" by resorting to Section 5
and even the Necessary and Proper Clause.380
Justice Harlan's view grants to Section 5 a broader reading of
the term "provisions," a failing in the prior theory, but it also takes a
strict view of the term "enforce." The view finds support in the
tradition of enforcement being reactive and remedial, rather than
prescriptive. It also claims support from an unlikely source: John
Bingham. Recall that Representative Bingham boasted that upon a
second reading of Barron, he decided to imitate the Founders and
began the Fourteenth Amendment with the same language as Article
I, Section 10: "No State shall.''38, That section, of course, is subject to
judicial enforcement only, and admits of no role for Congress, except
as specifically provided. Justice Harlan's reading of Section 5 is
faithful to its text and the structure of the Constitution, and has some
support in the legislative history.
3. Independent Congressional Enforcement of Section 1
A third view, one which claims some support from Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Morgan, suggests that Section 5 em-
powers Congress to enforce Section 1, not only in the absence of a
judicial finding of violation, but even in the face of a judicial finding of
378. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649 (emphasis added).
379. Id. at 666 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
380. Id. at 667-68.
381. See text accompanying notes 245-47. Professor Burt argues that Bingham, at least in
1866, recognized "the propriety of... final appeal of all questions of law arising under [the Civil
Rights Act] to the Supreme Court of the United States." Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II:
A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 S. Ct. Rev. 81, 89 (quoting Cong. Globe at 1291 (cited in note 189)
(statement of Rep. Bingham)). Burt concludes that "[ilt is unlikely that Bingham would
interpret the very same language in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as conferring a broad,
even unreviewable, discretion in Congress to determine the substance of § 1." Id. at 89.
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no violation of Section 1.382 It thus grants Congress the power to
determine state constitutional violations in the absence of judicial
findings, and perhaps even when Congress's determinations conflict
with the opinion of the federal judiciary. 3 This view claims support
in statements of Jacob Howard, and it might profitably look to John
Bingham as well. In his post-ratification explanation of Section 5,
John Bingham pointed to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments as 'imitations... upon the powers of the States which
never were imposed on them before" and as "granting to the Congress
of the United States express powers which never were in Congress
before." 84 He opined that it was "competent for the Congress of the
United States to-day to declare that no State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the freedom of speech, the freedom of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble together and
petition for redress of grievances. ' '385
Senator Howard's views are far less conclusive. As he intro-
duced the resolution that would become the Fourteenth Amendment,
Howard acknowledged that Section 1 was simply a "restrain[t] [on]
the power of the States... [and] not powers granted to Congress." s6
He declared that Section 5 plainly conferred something new; it was an
"affirmative delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the prin-
ciples of all these guarantees, a power not found in the
Constitution.'' 7 In his view, Section 5 "casts upon Congress the re-
sponsibility of seeing... that all the sections of the amendment are
carried out.... It enables Congress, in case the States shall enact
laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct that
legislation by a formal congressional enactment."35 8 Howard's role for
382. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649-52 & n.10. See Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 103 (1966) (stating that
Morgan left no doubt that Section 5 gives Congress the power to deal with conduct outside the
scope of Section 1). But see Conkle, 56 Mont. L. Rev. at 53-55 (cited in note 370) (questioning
whether Congress has the power to interfere with Court-determined "constitutional coherence");
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is
Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 462 (1994) (arguing that Congress cannot "command
the Court to yield to congressional judgments about... the Constitution's liberty-bearing
provisions'9.
383. Cox, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 106-07 (cited in note 382) (asserting that after Morgan,
Congress has "concurrent power to invalidate state legislation").
384. Cong. Globe at app.85 (cited in note 1).
385. Id. But see Burt, 1969 S. Ct. Rev. at 88-90 (cited in note 381) (citing instances where
Bingham indicated that the Supreme Court would be the final arbiter of the amendment).
386. Cong. Globe at 2766 (cited in note 189).
387. Id.
388. Id. at 2768.
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Section 5 is consistent with either the majority's or Justice Harlan's
opinion in Morgan.
There are few other contemporaneous sources to support the
Court's broad view of Section 5. The Court in Morgan cited Howard
(but not Bingham) and various secondary sources 89 for the proposi-
tion that Section 5 granted "the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause."390 Virtually all who spoke during the
debates to the question of Section 5's scope acknowledged that Section
5 was similar to the Necessary and Proper Clause, but as I have
shown, for many members of the Thirty-ninth and Forty-second
Congresses, that fact did not answer whether there had to be a sepa-
rate grant of authority to Congress in Section 1 on which the
Necessary and Proper Clause, or something very similar to a neces-
sary and proper clause, could operate. The Morgan Court stepped
right over this question and assumed the broadest powers in
Congress.
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were focused
primarily on redefining federalism and were less intent on redefining
separation of powers. Section 5 was important to the Framers be-
cause of what it said about the relationship between Congress and the
states, not between Congress and the federal judiciary. 391 While
members of the Thirty-ninth Congress displayed their displeasure
with the Court-mainly over its resolution of Dred Scott-the mem-
bers were acutely aware of the Court's role in constitutional interpre-
tation and repeatedly cited Court decisions to strengthen their own
arguments.39 2 If Congress was deeply distrustful of the Court, the
debates over Section 5 do not reflect it. Congress showed no inclina-
tion to dispossess the Court of its jurisdiction, and the members fully
understood that the Fourteenth Amendmeit would be committed to
the Court's interpretation and enforcement.3 93
389. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-49 nn.7-8.
390. Id. at 650. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and
Equal Protection, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 603, 619 (1975) ("[Ilf anything remains of the rationale of
Katzenbach v. Morgan, Congress should have the power to create a newsmen's privilege binding
against the states").
391. Burt, 1969 S. Ct. Rev. at 94 (cited in note 381). See also id. at 95-96 (suggesting that
even if the 39th Congress was suspicious of the Court in the past, it had reason to trust the
Court in the future). Professor Frantz's observation that the Framers distrusted the federal
judiciary and attempted to enlarge the powers of Congress is generally true. See Laurent B.
Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73
Yale L. J. 1353, 1356 (1964). But it found its fullest expression in John Bingham's failed
proposal. See text accompanying note 189.
392. See, for example, text accompanying notes 196, 202, 207-09.
393. See, for example, text following note 265.
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There are other good reasons for concluding that Congress
assumed it would have -a lesser interpretive role than the Court.
During the debates over Bingham's first proposal, Representative
Davis criticized Bingham's proposed amendment as a "grant for origi-
nal legislation by Congress. [Congress] ... is itself the judge of the
measure of [equal] protection. Its legislation may be universal. It
may enlarge protection, it may circumscribe it and limit it, if only it
make it equal. 394 Davis was not alone in his concerns that Bingham's
proposal would result in uniform substantive laws. Five years later
Representative Garfield pointed to the textual differences between
Bingham's proposal and the Fourteenth Amendment as the clearest
evidence of congressional intent regarding the latter:
The [Fourteenth Amendment] exerts its force directly upon the States, laying
restrictions and limitations upon their power and enabling Congress to enforce
these limitations. The other, the rejected proposition, would have brought the
power of Congress to bear directly upon the citizens, and contained a clear
grant of power to Congress to legislate directly for the protection of life, liberty,
and property within the States. The [Fourteenth Amendment] limited but did
not oust the jurisdiction of the State over these subjects. The [Bingham pro-
posal] gave Congress plenary power to cover the whole subject with its jurisdic-
tion .... to the exclusion of the State authorities. 395
According to Garfield,
[I]t became evident that many leading Republicans of this House would not
consent to so radical a change in the Constitution... it became perfectly
evident, both to the members of the Senate and of the House .... that the
measure could not command a two-thirds vote of Congress, and for that reason
the proposition was virtually withdrawn.39
Nevertheless, the Court in Morgan effectively adopted Bingham's
failed amendment.397
394. Cong. Globe at 1087 (cited in note 189).
395. Cong. Globe at app.151 (cited in note 1).
396. Id. See Oregon u. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 160 & n.11 (1970) (Harlan, J., writing for the
Court) (recognizing that postponement of Rep. Bingham's original amendment meant that it
was dropped).
397. See Alfred Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 St. Louis U. L. J. 331, 381 (1967) ("The result of [United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)] is to resurrect the rejected first draft of the Bingham
amendment... and enshrine it in all of its glory into the fourteenth amendment" (footnote
omitted)). See also Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, The Constitution, and Congress, 1863-1869 at
92 (U. Kansas, 1990) (arguing that any construction of Section 1 must not be "subject to the
objections that caused the rejection of Bingham's original amendment"); Alexander M. Bickel,
The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 60 (1955)
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In Morgan, the Court noted one important limitation on the
section 5 power. "Congress'[s] power under [Section] 5 is limited to
adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment;
[Section] 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute
these guarantees. 398  Those guarantees are of two kinds: federal
disabilities and personal rights. If we take the Court at its word, that
Congress acquired no power in Section 5 to "dilute" the guarantees of
the First Amendment, then Congress cannot abrogate or dilute the
guarantees made to the states. The Morgan power may work so far
as the personal priviliges or immunities of Amendments Two through
Eight are concerned, but Congress's enforcement of the Morgan power
cannot improve upon constitutional promises of federal abstention to
the states. It is a contradiction that Congress could claim the general
power to enforce through legislation a provision that specifically
begins "Congress shall make no law."
V. SECTION 5 AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
A. Section 5 and the Reconstruction of the First Amendment
In the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ('RFRA"),
Congress has provided that a state "shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion" unless the state demonstrates that the
burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and
"is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest. 399  The requirement applies "even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability." Congress stated
expressly that its authority to bind the states is found in Section 5. 400
('Presumably the lesson taught by the defeat of the Bingham amendment had been learned.
Congress was not to have unlimited discretion, and it was not to have the leeway represented by
'necessary and proper' power'.
398. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
399. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a), (b). The Act applies to "government," which is defined to
include "a State, or a subdivision of a State." Id. at § 2000bb-2(1).
400. See, for example, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S. Rep. No. 103-11, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1993) (discussing congressional power to enact RFRA under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I); Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, H.R. Rep. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1993) (same). For
commentators supporting Congress's use of Section 5, see The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, Hearings before the Senate Committee on S. 2969 before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 92-97, 129 (1992) ("Senate RFRA Hearings) (statement of
Professor Douglas Laycock); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, Hearings on H.R. 2797
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Before addressing whether Congress has authority to enact
RFRA under Section 5, I wish to begin with a slightly different ques-
tion. In the absence of the Fourteenth Amendment, could Congress
enact RFRA? The answer must be no. First, Congress lacks any af-
firmative source of power by which it can enact a law requiring the
states to observe the compelling state interest test. The best evidence
for this is that the 103rd Congress offered no other source for its
authority, and no one testifying before Congress offered any other
source from among Congress's enumerated powers as an alternative
to Section 5.401 Second, Congress certainly could not claim power
before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 353-59 (1992) ("House RFRA Hearings") (statement of Professor
Douglas Laycock); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377 before
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 54 (1990) (statement of Rev. John H. Buchanan, Jr.); Hearings on H.R.
5377 at 72-79 (letter from Professor Douglas Laycock to Rep. Don Edwards (Oct. 3, 1990)); David
M. Ackerman, CRS Report for Congress-The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the
Religious Freedom Act: A Legal Analysis 30-31 (1992) (on file with the Author); Thomas C.
Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 62-68 (1994); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 221, 249-252.
For commentators questioning Congress's use of Section 5, see Senate RFRA Hearings at
116, 121-25 (statement of Bruce Fein); House RFRA Hearings at 372-74, 385-91 (statement of
Professor Ira C. Lupu); Conkle, 56 Mont. L. Rev. at 60-79 (cited in note 370); Ira C. Lupu,
Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1, 58-59 (1993).
401. Professor Lupu suggested Congress might ground RFRA in the Spending or Commerce
Clauses, but he concluded that "these two power grants, alone or taken together, will not
support the full sweep of the Act." House RFRA Hearings at 385-86 (cited in note 400). See
Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse
under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 357, 361-64 (1994)
(discussing the limits of congressional power under the Constitution); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and
the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 171,
212-16 (1995) (questioning congressional power to enforce RFRA); Rex E. Lee, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 73, 90-91
n.79 (discussing possible congressional sources of constitutional authority for the enforcement of
RFRA); Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of
Legislative Power, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 247, 286-87 (1994) (discussing the constitutionality of RFRA).
Whether Congress can constitutionally apply RFRA to the states raises a very different
question from whether Congress can apply RFRA to the federal government. The Senate Report
noted that RFRA "does not purport to legislate the standard of review to be applied by the
Federal courts in cases brought under [the First Amendment]. Instead, it creates a new statu-
tory prohibition on governmental action." S. Rep. No. 103-11 at 14 n.43 (cited in note 400). See
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56
Mont. L. Rev. 249, 251-52 & n.10 (1995) (discussing congressional power to regulate states
under RFRA). Congress has a much stronger claim under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
restrict "Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. While Professor Hamilton has
demonstrated that Congress is not without its problems on this score, Hamilton, 16 Cardozo L.
Rev. at 366, 373-74, to the extent that Congress created a form of religious exemption for
activities legitimately regulated under its enumerated powers, Congress may be on more secure
ground. See, for example, Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)
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under the First Amendment. We need not even speculate on whether
Congress would have power if the amendment were stated as a per-
sonal privilege, as with Amendments Two through Eight. A disability
specific to Congress, located in the Bill of Rights, cannot confer power
to Congress. Third, not only is the First Amendment not a source of
power to Congress, it forbids Congress from enacting a whole class of
laws. Even if Congress thought it had an independent, enumerated
power to enact RFRA-through, for example, the Spending or
Commerce Clauses-it would run afoul of the First Amendment. So
far as the states are concerned, the First Amendment takes back
whatever power over First Amendment subjects Congress can claim
derivatively in its enumerated powers.40 2
Having concluded that Congress would not have power to
enact RFRA in the absence of the Fourteenth Amendment, we must
ask whether Congress acquired the power to enact RFRA in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Here we confront the broader question of
whether Congress enjoys the same power to enforce incorporated
rights as it has to enforce the express provisions of Sections 1, 2, and
3. In Hutto v. Finney403 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
did not bar attorney's fees awards404 following violations of Section
1983.405 Importantly, the underlying claims in Hutto were based on
violations of the Eighth Amendment. While the majority did not
expressly address whether Congress's section 5 powers extended to
incorporated rights, its approval was assumed in the decision. Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented, in part on the grounds
that "it is not at all clear.., that it follows that Congress has the
same enforcement power under [Section] 5 with respect to a
constitutional provision which has merely been judicially
'incorporated' into the Fourteenth Amendment that it has with
respect to a provision which was placed in that Amendment by the
drafters. ' 406 Justice Rehnquist has not found further supporters for
his concerns.
(holding that § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not violate the Establishment Clause by
exempting religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition against discrimination based on
religion); Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) (holding that an act prohibiting certain U.S.
officers from giving to, or receiving from any other officer, money or property for political
purposes was constitutional).
402. See Note, 105 Harv. L. Rev. at 1714 n.97 (cited in note 315).
403. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
404. The award was based on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
405. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 689; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
406. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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If incorporation of the Eighth Amendment is a correct doctrine,
then Hutto probably follows.47 There would be no reason for us to
distinguish between state violations of personal rights incorporated
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause or even the Due Process
Clause and state violations of, for example, "pure" procedural due
process rights.4 8  But there is still the problem of the First
Amendment, and Hutto does not make it go away. The Fourteenth
Amendment might have made the personal privileges and immunities
of United States citizens applicable to the states, but that would not
necessarily affect the First Amendment. So far as I can determine,
until the passage of RFRA, no court has ever considered the impact of
Section 5 on a matter involving First Amendment rights.409
Instead, we might conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment
repeals the First Amendment insofar as it is a guarantee to the
states. That is implicit in the Court's current theory of incorporation.
The problem with this theory is that there is no hard evidence to
support it. Because implied repeals are not favored, we should insist
that if Section 5 meant to trump the First Amendment, then Section 5
should state so in very specific terms. The text does not so provide,
and that is consistent with John Bingham's assurances that his
proposed amendment would not deprive the states of anything that
belonged to them.
We might also conclude that the First Amendment codifies
only personal rights. That might bring First Amendment rights
within the Privileges and Immunities Clause. But that is revisionist
history; it gives effect to Madison's original proposal rather than the
Amendment that Congress passed and the states ratified.
Unfortunately, this version of revisionist history is the prevailing
view of the First Amendment, that the impediment to application of
407. See Senate RFRA Hearings at 92 (cited in note 400) (statement of Professor Douglas
Laycock); Pawa, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1096 (cited in note 370).
408. Hutto may be read narrowly as recognizing Congress's power to prescribe a remedy,
rather than the power to prescribe substantive standards. Hamilton, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. at 391
n.127 (cited in note 401).
409. See Idleman, 73 Tex. L. Rev. at 318 (cited in note 401) ("[Ihe Court has never really
explained the relationship between Section Five and incorporated rights, and, until it does, it
would be unwise to assume that a strong reading of Morgan... will be extended to give
Congress broad power in interpreting these rights'). The district courts that have recently
ruled on RFRA's constitutionality have divided. Compare Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp.
355 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding RFRA unconstitutional) with Sasnett v. Wisconsin Dept. of
Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Wisc. 1995) (holding RFRA constitutional) and Belgard v.
Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 570 (D. Haw. 1995) (holding RFRA constitutional). See also Canedy v.
Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting, but no resolving, the issue).
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the Bill of Rights is Barron simpliciter, and not the structure of the
amendment itself. As I have demonstrated, the personal rights
argument has some basis as applied to the Second through the Eighth
Amendments, but it does not work with respect to the First.
B. Reconciling Section 5, the First Amendment, and RFRA
RFRA depends on two separate assumptions about the
Fourteenth Amendment. First, that Section 1 incorporates the Bill of
Rights, making it applicable to the states. Second, that Congress has
the power to enforce state observance of those rights. If either of
these assumptions falls, RFRA must also fall.
I will not here challenge RFRA any further insofar as it rests
on incorporation of the First Amendment. Incorporation of that
amendment is a questionable doctrine, questionable as a matter of
text, history, and theory. We must, however, acknowledge with
Professor Kurland that at this point incorporation is "fait accompli.410
Deciphering how the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of
Rights is still relevant because it makes a difference if the Bill of
Rights is incorporated as a text (the 'jot for jot" incorporation) or as a
collection of broad, substantive principles found in the common law of
due process. The question of incorporation's legitimacy will likely
remain open in the academy, but at this point we probably must con-
cede that, correct or not, incorporation is with us.
Even conceding incorporation, we must still reconcile whether
Congress may enforce the First Amendment pursuant to Section 5.
This is a different question than asking whether the First
Amendment applies to the states at all. Reconciling the First
Amendment (an express disability in Congress creating an implied
immunity in the states) with the Fourteenth Amendment (an express
disability in the states and an express power in Congress) requires
recollection of a relationship completely lost in modern discussions of
the First Amendment: the relationship between Congress and the
federal judiciary.
If we think of the First Amendment as the Founders intended,
an unexpected solution emerges from our dilemma. The First
Amendment is not a general restriction on the powers of the federal
government; rather it is a restriction on the powers of Congress. And,
as I have discussed, Congress's section 5 power does not trump its
410. Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 Vill. L. Rev. 3, 10-11 (1978-79).
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first amendment disability. Closer attention to the First Amendment,
however, shows that it does not similarly disable the federal courts.
The federal judiciary remains, by design, empowered to hear cases
and controversies, including those touching on the subject matter of
the First Amendment.
We can give fuller effect to both Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as interpreted, and the First Amendment, as written, by
recognizing the power of the judiciary alone to enforce the modern
First Amendment. This view respects the structure of the First
Amendment, and preserves the intentions of the Founders embedded
in that structure. To the Founders, the federal courts represented far
less of a threat to the cause of religious liberty than Congress.
Whereas Congress might establish a national religion or interfere
with state protection of religious freedom, the federal judiciary could
only enforce state laws. James Madison, of course, did not share the
view of a majority of the Founders that religious freedom should re-
main the exclusive province of the states, and he strongly urged a
constitutional guarantee of religious liberty in the states. But "right
or wrong, the framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights believed
that state governments were, in some vital respects, safer repositories
of power over individual liberties than the federal government,"4 11 or,
at least, than Congress. Certainly state legislatures, no less than
Congress, might encourage religious factionalism, but the states were
subject to pressures that Congress was not. As Professor McConnell
pointed out, "Religious dissenters were free to travel to more tolerant
states, and did; moreover, the example of the more tolerant states
generated pressure on the more restrictive states to modify their
policies. ' 412
The Founders' judgment over the role of the states was
revisited in 1868. Although the intent of the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment was not entirely clear, they obviously
intended some kind of federal oversight of state protection of
fundamental rights. If they intended complete federal control over
the substance of freedom of religion and expression, they were, as we
have seen, unsuccessful in their mechanism. The Court's subsequent
missteps into incorporation have, nevertheless, assured some federal
control of the protection of First Amendment rights in the states. But
411. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1484, 1506 (1987).
412. Id.
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federal control does not necessarily mean congressional control.
Leaving enforcement of the First Amendment with the judiciary
resolves two important separation of powers problems. First, it
satisfies the objections of a number of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment who, concerned about the substantive reach of Section 1
and the effect of Section 5, thought the courts a better forum in which
to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights against the states.413 More
importantly, the federal judiciary is not subject to the First
Amendment's 'jurisdictional" disability. Simply stated, the judiciary
is not "Congress."
I do not suggest that the judiciary is more capable of answer-
ing the substantive issues of the First Amendment than Congress.
Recent experience offers little hope that any solid consensus on the
First Amendment will emerge from the Court. In fact, I have
suggested that my proffered solution is only a partial corrective to
problems created in large measure by the Supreme Court. The judici-
ary is, however, better situated to deal with the First Amendment by
force of the Constitution itself. And there is much to be said for find-
ing some refuge in a stable source of interpretation, even in an oracle
as fallible as the Court.
My approach would not deny Congress power to enforce non-
substantive equal protection and due process claims, even if the
claims in some way involve religious freedom. The First Amendment
is a constraint on the Morgan power, but the Fourteenth Amendment
gives Congress an independent power to enforce states' failure to
afford equal protection and due process to all persons in the exercise
of their first amendment rights. This interpretation would be consis-
tent with Representatives Stevens and Garfield and others who ex-
pressed concern over equality within states, rather than uniformity
between states. 414 Thus, for example, Congress might retain some
power under the Fourteenth Amendment where a state failed to
enforce its laws neutrally with respect to religion.415 But Congress
413. Moreover, there is nothing special about incorporation under the Due Process Clause
that would prevent the Court from limiting enforcement of the First Amendment to the courts.
Nor is there anything in Professor Amar's more textually rigorous "refined incorporation" under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause that would prevent it; indeed, Professor Amar has almost
invited such a result. See Amar, 101 Yale L. J. at 1274 (cited in note 73) (stating that a
federalism-based First Amendment might "permit differential treatment of state and federal
governments'.
414. See Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 119 (cited in note 216).
415. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed.
2d 472 (1993) (finding that a local statute prohibiting animal sacrifice discriminated against the
Santeria), might be such an example. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (finding that a
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cannot prescribe the substantive content of first amendment rights in
the states.
Finally, leaving enforcement of incorporated first amendment
rights to the Court may further the federalism aspect of the First
Amendment. RFRA was prompted by the Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith.416  In Smith, the Court held that
"religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular
religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest."417 Concurring in the judgment, Justice O'Connor accused
the majority of "depart[ing] from settled First Amendment jurispru-
dence," which had struck "sensible balances between religious liberty
and compelling state interests.418 In a perverse way, Smith uninten-
tionally accommodates both the Founders and the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Through incorporation the Supreme Court
has determined to supply a constitutional baseline for religious free-
dom. In Smith it dramatically lowered the standard, refusing to ex-
empt religiously motivated conduct that conflicts with generally ap-
plicable criminal laws. The result fairly invites the states to revise
Smith and readopt as state constitutional standards the compelling
state interest or some other test.419 As the states fashion their own
rules for religious liberty, free exercise questions in the future may
admit more than one solution, so long as the states respect the broad
contours of Smith. Effectively in Smith, the Court has declared it will
not prescribe, within limits, the unique content of free exercise rights.
From the states' perspective, the much maligned Smith deci-
sion interferes far less with state control of religious freedom than the
prior compelling interest standard.420 Leaving religion clause princi-
ples in the hands of the Court thus assures less interference with
state laws, providing more opportunity for states to protect religious
liberty under their own laws and constitutions. This result is
consonant with the equality-based reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. The net effect may be that many states will
statute exempting certain religious organizations from reporting requirements discriminated
against the Unification Church).
416. 494 U.S. 872 (1991)
417. Id. at 886 n.3.
418. Id. at 901, 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
419. See Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under State
Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 747, 772
(1993).
420. For examples of the application of the compelling interest standard, see Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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provide greater protection of free exercise principles than the
Constitution presently requires. And that result is certainly within
the spirit of Morgan.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Constitution exhibits the close attention the Founders
paid to the form of relationships among the departments of the fed-
eral government, the states, and the people. Our inattention to the
form and structure of the Bill of Rights, and in particular, our failure
to regard it as an integral part of the larger document-for which
form and structure are vital-is regrettable.421 It is a near accident of
history, and certainly unfortunate, that the Bill of Rights was located
outside of Article I, Section 9, where it rightfully belonged. Had the
Founders located it there, as Madison intended,422 it would have
better served as a reminder of the limitations of the federal
constitution and the place of state constitutions.
The twin themes of federalism and separation of powers have
woven themselves throughout the text and history of the First
Amendment, just as they did in the text and history of the
Constitution of 1789. Those themes, which we are accustomed to
seeing in other provisions of the Constitution, may strike us as out of
place in our current debates over religious liberty. But if we still
harbor any sense that form and structure in our Constitution matter,
then the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is not only an appropriate
occasion to consider the First Amendment, but it compels us to
reexamine the basis for Congress to prescribe the substance of
matters placed beyond its ken.
The First Amendment committed the substance of religious
liberty and free expression to the people of the several states, and it
left the federal judiciary competent to interpret those laws. At critical
junctures Congress and the Court have had to choose between careful
construction of the First Amendment, construction that would recog-
nize the federalism and separation of powers aspects of the First
Amendment, and more political goals. As we have seen, the
421. See Amar, 100 Yale L. J. at 1132 (cited in note 40).
422. See text accompanying note 65. The reasons had more to do with appearances than
legal interpretation. While Madison favored locating the Amendments in Article I, Section 9,
Roger Sherman and others thought that to do so would concede imperfection in the original
document and be an affront to George Washington. Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It
Means Today at 39, 44 (cited in note 65).
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Federalists of 1798 and the Radical Republicans of 1866 had remark-
ably similar views of the First Amendment. Both viewed it as protect-
ing purely personal liberties, and neither saw in the First
Amendment any impediment to Congress defining the standards for
political and religious expression. We vilify the Federalists and honor
the Radical Republicans because we disagree with the former and
agree with the latter in the uses to which they would put the First
Amendment. But we cannot honor the views of both without confess-
ing that they had questionable views of what it means to say
"Congress shall make no law."
We are once again poised to define Congress's power under the
First Amendment. In RFRA Congress has simply willed itself power
it cannot possess. This time Congress may well have the best of the
Court in its understanding of religious liberty, but whether the Court
agrees or disagrees with Congress over the substance of religious
liberty and freedom of expression, it can no longer abandon its duty to
police Congress for the states' and its own account.
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